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You see things; and you say "Why?" But I dream things that never 
were; and I say "Why not?" 
- The Serpent to Eve*"' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Judge Ginsburg has provided a judge's-eye view of the work of a United 
States Court of Appeals in her Dunwody Lecture. I From her perspective as a 
judge on the District of Columbia Circuit, she has done a fine job describing 
the process of deciding appellate cases and composing a reasoned decision.2 But 
simply describing "things as they are" in the decisional process will not suffice 
in this article for two reasons. First, Judge Ginsburg has already done that, 
as have other judges. 3 Second, one without personal experience in deciding 
cases should maintain an academic orientation. The focus here will therefore 
be on "things that never were" - proposals to reform the federal court system's 
middle tier. 
The emphasis is neither accidental nor merely expedient. As the bicentennial 
of the First Judiciary Act4 and the centennial of the courts of appeals approach,5 
the federal courts have drawn renewed attention. Over the years, and most 
recently, attention has been lavished on the Supreme Court and its problems. 6 
G. BERNARD SHAW, BACK "10 METHUSELHA - A METABIOLOGICAL PENTATEUCH 7 (reprinted 
ed. 1949). The line was made famous by President John Kennedy and was often rendered by 
Senator Robert Kennedy in his campaign for the presidency. A. SCHLESINGER, ROBERT KENNEDY 
AND HIS TIMES 886 n.· (1978). 
1. Ginsburg, The Obligation to Reason Why, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 205 (1985). 
2. Id. at 207-12. 
3. Part of the common law tradition allows for judges to step back from their daily dutle. 
and describe their decisionmaking process, often with provocative insights. Su generally R. ALDISERT, 
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1976) (edited readings); R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS - CRISIS AND 
REFORM (1985). Judge Ginsburg and her generation of judges have continued the tradition. Su, 
e.g., Edwards, The Role of a Judge in MorUm Society: Sorru: Riflections on Current Practice in Federal 
Appellate A{fjudication, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385 (1983-84); Ginsburg, Inviting Judicial Activism: A 
"Liberal" or "Conservative" Technique:', 15 GA. L. REV. 539 (1981). Rarer, but of growing signif-
icance, are the empirical evaluations by outsiders looking in. Su, e.g., Wasby, Oral Argurru:nt in the 
Ninth Circuit: The View From Bench and Bar, 11 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 21 (1981). 
4. Act of Septmber 24, 1789. ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
5. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. 
6. See, e.g., Edwards, The Rz:ring Work Load and Perceived "Bureaucracy" of the Federal Courts: 
A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Rerru:dies, 68 IOWA L. REV. 871. 891-93 (1983); 
Handler, What to Do With the Supreme Court's Burgeoning Calendar?, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 249 (1984); 
Hellman, The Business of the Suprerru: Court Under the Judiciary Act of 1925: The Plenary Docket in the 
1970's, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1711 (1978); Rehnquist, A Plea for Help: Solutions to Serious Problems 
Currently Experienced by the FederalJudicial System, 28 ST. LoUIS U.L.]. 1 (1984); Note, Of High Designs: 
A Compendium of Proposals to Reduce tIM Workload of the Suprerru: Court, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1307 (1983). 
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Understanding the middle tif;r, however, is the key to understanding the system 
because changes in the intermediate federal courts have reflected an evolution 
in the entire federal courts system.7 
Since 1891 the role and function of the intermediate tier has been constant, 
merely considered as a matter of statute.8 Yet, the mind reels from a centennial 
glimpse back at the social, economic and legal changes since those federal courts 
were created. Now, those pent up pressures for court reform show signs of 
overwhelming the venerable statutory framework, again suggesting that "great 
judiciary act," unlike great poems, are not written for all times.9 Prominent 
commentators have noted that the courts of appeals have felt the greatest pres-
sure. 10 Statistics bear out this conclusion. Filings in each of the three levels 
have increased in the last twenty years. While the civil fIlings in the district 
courts have increased by slightly more than a factor of three and the Supreme 
Court's docket has increased by less than a factor of three, fIlings in the courts 
of appeals have increased by nearly a factor of six. II Despite periodic increases 
in the number of judges, present judgepower and administrative techniques 
under existing jurisdictional statutes are being taxed to the limit. Undue delay 
and backlogs are not the only costs of this situation. Also at risk is the important 
role the courts of appeals play in our federal system. Understandably, proposals 
for reforms have been growing in number aild in urgency. 
This essay considers first the ideal role pf the intermediate court in the 
federal judicial institution. Against this ideal, the article explores the seriousness 
I 
of the threat presented by workload growth. The focus of this presentation is 
on reform. Intramural reforms are distinguished from extramural reforms. 12 
Intramural reforms, both accomplished and proposed, involve changes in how 
the courts of appeals themselves choose to perform within their traditional role 
I 
itself. Extramural reforms, both accomplished and proposed, involve congres-
sional changes in the role. A few editorials h?-ve been included along the way, 
7. Baker, Precedent Times Three: Stare Decisis in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 35 Sw. L.J. 687, 688 
(1981). 
8. See generally id. at 736·37 (Chronological Table of Federal Circuits). 
9. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT, A STUDY OF THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 107 (1927). 
10. See, e.g., Griswold, Cutting the Clock to Fit the Cloth: An Approach to Problems in the Federal 
Courts, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 787, 796 (1983) ("[T]he prqblem of burden on the courts is substantial 
and serious, and ... the place where it most significantly impinges is on the United States Courts 
of Appcals."); Haworth, Screening and Summary Procedures in the United States Courts oj Appeals, 1973 
WASH. U.L.Q. 257, 257 ("The federal intermediate appellate system is on the verge of ceasing to 
function as an effective administrator of justice."). More,than a decade ago, Justice Douglas opined, 
"[i]f there are any courts that are surfeited, they are the courts of appeals." Tidewater Oil Co. v. 
United States, 409 U.S. 151, 176 (1972). See generally irifra text accompanying notes 39-112. 
11. Feinberg, Constraining "The Least Dangerous Branch ": The Tradition oj Attacks on Judicial Power, 
59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 252, 275 (1984). See generally infra; text accompanying notes 39-112. 
12. For other classifications of proposed solutions, see generally J. MARTIN & E. PRESCOTT, 
I ApPELLATE COURT DELAY 6-17 (1981); Note, supra note 6, at 1308-10. 
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expressing preferences for one type of reform and for some choices within each 
type. 
One final note concerning the article's approach merits an introductory men-
tion. This essay discusses most all of the reforms that have been tried or 
proposed in the various courts of appeals. Those separate institutions are quite 
different, however, and likely will remain so unless a major structural extramural 
reform occurs. The First Circuit, with a handful of judges and a small geo-
graphic area, is quite different from the large and vast Ninth Circuit. The 
Second Circuit has a docket concentrated in one city. The District of Columbia 
Circuit bears a burdensome docket originating in the federal seat of government. 
Not all of the problems noted are found in each court of appeals, and the 
proposed reforms are not universal. Still, some value exists in collecting these 
proposals in one place; in short, III compiling a compendium. 
II. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF ApPEALS 
No apologies are necessary for beginning with the "ought." Later discussion 
will deal with the courts of appeals as they have evolved into their present 
state. For now the essay is concerned with the received wisdom of appellate 
ideals. This discussion serves as some measure for what has been done, what 
is left to be done, and what cannot be done about the intermediate federal 
court. 13 
While many authors have sought to describe the ideal appellate function in 
various formulations, contemporary writers must concede that Karl Llewellyn 
and Roscoe Pound have "long ago uttered every pertinent observation." 14 
Llewellyn and Pound taught that the dual appellate functions are correction of 
error (or pronouncing correctness) in particular litigation and declaration of law 
by creation, clarification, elaboration, or overruling. 15 Professors Carrington, 
13. justice Holmes once wrote of ideals, "[i)t often is a merit of an ideal to be unattainable. 
Its being so keeps forever before us something more to be done, and saves us from the ennui of 
a monotonous perfection." Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 463 
(1899). 
14. P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, jUSTIGE ON ApPEAL 8 n.21 (1976) [here· 
inafter cited as P. CARRINGTON). See generally K. LLEWELYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION -
DECIDING ApPEALS 11-15 (1960); R. POUND, ApPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 1-2 (1941); 
Pound, Causes of Popular Dzssatisjacti011 with the Administration of justice, 40 AM. U.L. REV. 729 
(1906). 
15. P. CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 2-3. See generally T. MARVEL, ApPELLATE COURTS AND 
LAWYERS (1978); D. MEADOR, ApPELLATE COURTS - STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF VOLUME 
(1974); A.B.A. COMM'N ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATINC TO Ap· 
PELLATE COURTS (Approved Draft 1977); A.B.A. COMM'N ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRA-
TION (Tent. Draft 1973); Parker, improving Apptllate Methods, 25 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1950). 
From time to time, thoughtful scholars have challenged the excesses of the received wisdom. Sa, t.g., 
Leflar, The Multi-Judge Decisional Process, 42 MD. L. REV. 722 (1983) (recapitulation of sound 
appellate practices); Wright, The Doubiful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 779 
(1957) ("I think we should refrain from agreeing that appellate courts are to do justice until we 
have seen the price we must pay for this concept. "). 
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Meador and Rosenberg have listed the process imperatives that assure appellate 
justice in terms of • 
judges who are impartial; are multi-partite; are identifiable, not anon-
ymous, and not mere auxiliaries; think individually, but act collegially; 
respect the interest of adversaries in being heard, but inform themselves 
fully on the material issues, evidence, and law on which decisions are 
to be made; and announce their reasons for decisions. 16 
In other words, the process must be "visibly rational" so far as judges function. 17 
This is the process imperative. 
Those same authors have reduced the appellate system's function to a black 
letter ideal: 
[T]he system must provide uniform and coherent enunCIatIOn and ap-
plication of the law; decisions that are expeditious, involving as few steps 
as possible; working conditions for judges which attract lawyers of high 
quality, who command professional respect; and working conditions for 
judges which will foster their humane concern for individual litigants. 18 
This is the ideal system function. The reality of the actual appellate function 
and any proposed reform must be assessed asymptotically, as they approach 
but never reach the ideal. 19 Furthering the present inquiry requires consideration 
of how these attitudes about the ideal system function may be restated within 
the context of our federal court system. 
As for the dual appellate functions of correction and declaration, the courts 
of appeals owe their origin to a congressional desire to provide only the former. 2o 
The correction function was alone the province of the courts of appeals in the 
1891 design. Congress freed the Supreme Court from a duty to correct error 
so that it could better perform the declaration function, which it alone was to 
perform. With occasional lapses, the Supreme Court today remains true to the 
1891 plan that it is not a court of error.21 Indeed, the Judges Bill of 1925 
reinforced this notion by reducing the Court's appellate docket.22 Recent pro-
posals would search out and destroy any vestiges of the correction function in 
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction.23 . 
Consistent with their original design, the courts of appeals continue to func-
tion as the federal judicial institution for correction of error. Indeed, over the 
16. P. CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 8-11. Judge Ginsburg describes the responsibility of 
fairly getting in right. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 206·07. 
17. P. CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 11. 
18. /d. at 11-12. 
19. Id. 
20. When created, the courts of appeals were meant "to correct individual injustice and 
control erroneous or lawless behaviour by judges or other officials while the Supreme Court [was 
to] assure doctrinal coherence and national uniformity." /d. at 200. 
21. Cj. Florida v. Rodriquez, 105 S. Ct. 308, 311-14 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
22. Act of February 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936. 
23. See general{y Note, supra note 6. 
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years the trend has been toward near complete reliance on the intermediate 
courts to correct error, as greater demands have been placed on the federal 
judicial institution at each level. 24 Significantly at odds with the original design, 
however, the courts of appeals have come to share the declaration function with 
the Supreme Court. 25 If not less fallible, at least these courts' decisions are 
becoming more final in all areas of federal law. 26 Justice Rehnquist has agreed, 
admitting that the courts of appeals' autonomy in performing the declaration 
function has gone so far that the Supreme Court's supervisory authority has 
been severely diminished. 27 The Court cannot accept a sufficient number of 
appeals to allow it to impose national uniformity.28 
Considering the highest level of abstraction, the roles of the federal appellate 
courts have changed. In the original scheme, the Supreme Court performed 
both the declaration function and what limited correction function that was 
contemplated. No intermediate tier existed. When the correction function be-
came more important and the number of appeals threatened the Supreme Court's 
own declaration duty, Congress created the intermediate appellate court to serve 
as the court of error. In the modern era, the volume of appeals requires the 
courts of appeals today to perform the declaration function, to a large extent, 
free from Supreme Court supervision. Thus, events have overtaken design. 
At the less abstract level of appellate function, the key concepts are process 
imperatives and system function. The process imperative of visible rationality 
and the ideal system function of procedural regularity may be recast to fit the 
unique federal court system. \Vhile Professors Carrington, Meador and Rosen-
berg have gone far to set the terms of the general debate over appellate function, 
the present discussion is concerned with the ideal role of the United States 
Courts of Appeals. 
Judge Wald, United States Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, has identified five objectives of the federal judicial institution that articulate 
a federal process imperative: 
24. See generally Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function 
of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542 (1969). The perhaps greater significance of 
this larger role for correction in the relationship between trial and appellate court is beyond the 
scope of this article. See generally Wright, supra note 15. 
25. Justice White recently made the point: 
The Supreme Court of the United States reviews only a small percentage of all judg-
ments issued by the twelve courts of appeals. Each of the courts of appeals, therefore, is 
for all practical purposes the final expositor of the federal law within its geographical 
jurisdiction. This crucial fact makes each of those courts a tremendously important influence 
in the development of the federal law, both constitutional and statutory. 
White, Dedication - Fifth Circuit Symposium, 15 TEX. TECH. L. REV. ix (1984). 
26. This paraphrase is taken from Justice Jackson's aphorism: "We are not final because we 
are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 
540 (1953). See also Baker, Constitutional Law, 27 Loy. L. REV. 805, 862 (1981). 
27. Rehnquist, A Plea for Help: Solutions to Serious Problems Currently Experienced by the Federal 
Judicial System, 28 ST. LoUIS U.L.]. 1, 4-5 (1984). 
28. !d. 
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First, we want to make correct decisions on the myriad cases and 
motions they face. Basically, decisions should accurately reflect the facts 
in the record and existing law on the subject. Ideally, we also should 
aim to season the logic of our decisions with an understanding of real-
world constraints on litigants (who are often government agencies in our 
court), the public, and the judiciary. 
Second, the courts' opinions should contain reasoned explanations of 
their decisions to lend them legitimacy, permit public evaluation, and 
impose a discipline on judges. 
Third, courts should produce timely decisions and opinions, meaning, 
quite candidly, that we should hold our feet to the fire. 
Fourth, courts should strive for uniform decisions, especially, as in 
our circuit, when one tribunal is composed of a number of separate 
panels. 
Fifth, the courts must bear in mind that, as the only unelected branch 
of our Constitutional triad, they must act always to preserve and to 
reinforce public confidence in their integrity. Historically, achievement 
of this objective has required judges to walk a fme and precarious line: 
to render decisions based on the facts and the law, resisting personal 
bias toward individuals or groups, while preserving the values of the 
judge's own personal reasoning, experience, and ultimately, sense of re-
sponsibility.29 
231 
For a federal version of the ideal system function, reliance may be placed 
on the statement of conditions then professor Frankfurter believed "indispen-
sable to a seasoned, collective judicial judgment": 
1. Encouragement of oral argument; discouragement of oratory. The 
Socratic method is applied; questioning, in which the whole Court freely 
engage, clarifies the mind of the Justices as to the issues and guides the 
cQ.urse of argument through real difficulties. 
2. Consideration of every matter, be it an important case or merely 
a minor motion, by every Justice before conference, and action at fixed, 
frequent and long conferences of the Court. This assures responsible 
deliberation and decision by the whole Court. 
3. Assignment by the Chief Justice of cases for opmIOn-WrItmg to 
the different Justices after discussion and vote at conference. Flexible use 
is thus made of the talents and energies of the Justices, and the writer 
of the opinion enters upon the task not only with the knowledge of the 
conclusions of his associates, but with the benefit of their suggestions 
made at the conference. 
29. Wald, The Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy, or Collegiality Under Challengel, 
42 MD. L. REV. 766, 768-69 (1983). 
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4. Distribution of draft OpInIOnS in print, for consideration of them 
by the individual Justices in advance of the conference and then their 
discussion at subsequent conferences. Ample time is thus furnished for 
care in formulation of result, and for writing dissents. This practice 
makes for team play, and encourages individual inquiry instead of sub-
servient unanimity. 30 
Although Frankfurter presented this ideal for the Supreme Court, such an ideal 
system function would fit the courts of appeals, at least roughly. 31 
30. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 9, at VII-VIII. 
3!. Hellman, Central Staff in Appellate Courts: The Experience rif the Ninth Circuit, 68 CALIF. L. 
REV. 937, 938 (1980). Professor Hellman states that co-author Frankfurter was the originator. Id. 
at 938 n.!. 
Of course, the comparison suffers when Justice Frankfurter's Supreme Court ideals are applied 
to an intermediate court with mandatory review authority which sits in multiple panels and decides 
thousands of appeals each year. Some accommodation of the ideal for the panel mechanism must 
be made in this context. His generalization remains a helpful starting place. 
Another helpful statement of the ideals or goals is found in T. MARVEL, supra note 15, at 243-44 
(app. B): 
At the outset it is best to have as a foundation a list of goals for appellate court 
decision-making procedures. The major, overriding problem is how best to inform the 
judges so that they can decide cases as well as possible within the time constraints. This 
involves numerous subsidiary goals, but the list that follows is limited to those that have 
traditionally been troublesome in appellate courts. 
1. The judges should receive as much relevant information about the case as possible. 
It is more important that information pertaining to the court's lawmaking functlon be 
complete than that pertaining only to the dispute-deciding function, for lawmaking decisions 
ordinarily have a greater impact on society. But the information, however used, should 
be as free as possible from time-wasting extraneous material. 
2. Each judge sitting on a case should know enough about it to make his own informed, 
independent decision. He should delegate as little as possible to the judge assigned the 
case and to law clerks and statT attorneys. This, of course, is a matter of degree; time 
problems make delegation of independent research and study of the record necessary, and 
delegation of the search for information necessarily means some delegation of decision-
making. 
3. Similarly, each judge should participate in the content of any opinion, especially if 
published, with which he concurs (except for the details of writing style). A number of 
minds can produce an opinion more serviceable to the bar than can one mind alone. So, 
again, each judge must understand the case, and he must study and comment on draft 
opinions as thoroughly as time and the preservation of friendly relations at the court allow. 
Also, the author of an opinion should be receptive to his colleagues' suggestions. 
4. A judge should be open-minded in that he should withhold his final deciSion until 
he is fully informed and should weigh carefully arguments presented to support the opposing 
sides. 
5. Appeals should be decided quickly, and judges should save time whenever possible 
without lessening the quality of their work. Judges' time is in short supply at many courts 
because of increased case loads and administrative duties. 
6. Judges should get as much help as they can from counsel, both to save time and 
to improve their decisions and opinions. Judges believe that the quality of much appellate 
advocacy is low, and the trend now is to rely less on counsel and more on staff research. 
But, at the least, judges should use counsel as much as they can if only to check the work 
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The constitutional scheme mandates recognition of federalism and separation 
of powers when contemplating an ideal federal appellate system function. Fed-
eralism produces two opposing effects. On the one hand, federal appellate ju-
risdiction accomplishes uniformity, while centralizing judicial power and 
facilitating hierarchical control. 32 On the other hand, it fosters diversity. Inferior 
federal courts in this country33 are unique among federal systems. Article III 
judges are the most significant national officials systematically located around 
the country. Consequently, national policies are diffused and, in tum, influenced 
by local political and social concerns.34 
Separation of powers doctrine legitimates the theory and exercise of judicial 
review by these appellate tribunals. Both of the lower federal courts serve with 
the Supreme Court as guardians of individual rights against legislative and 
executive excess. Independent judicial review traditionally has been central to 
the protection of individual rights.35 Toward this end, article III judges have 
been small in number, highly qualified, and free from popular control.36 Thus 
constitutional values of federalism and separated powers provide the larger con-
text for identifying the ideal role and function of the federal intermediate court. 
Articulating these concepts of ideal and role only begins the inquiry. The 
question of whether these norms have ever been achieved or if they are achiev-
able, is left to others. This article will discuss the current state of the federal 
appellate judiciary to identify the threat to these essential qualities and the 
coping strategies already in place and proposed. In the process, the article 
explores whether the courts of appeals are moving toward or away from the 
political system's aspirations for them. A social demand does exist for a high 
quality federal judicial institution: The issue, in economic terms, becomes whether 
a decline will occur in appellate quality as the move from an elite to a mass 
distribution of federal judicial services continues.37 The best tradition of appellate 
done at the court. 
These goals are obviously very interrelated, and the categorization must be somewhat 
arbitrary. But they do provide a background for comparing present procedures with the 
procedures suggested here. In doing so, I shall try to present a balanced picture, explaining 
the major problems behind the suggestions along with their benefits. 
The purposive orientation of the judges themselves include: adjudicator, ritualist, administrator, 
lawmaker, and educator. J. HOWARD, COURTS OF ApPEALS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 125-57 (1981). 
See also Carrington, supra note 24, at 550-54. 
32. Shapiro, Islam and Appeal, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 350, 350 (1980). 
33. "Inferior" is, of course, the Constitution's term, and is not to be taken qualitatively. 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
34. R. RICHARDSON & K. VINES, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL COURTS 173-74 (1970). 
35. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See generally Baker & Baldwin, 
Eighth Amendment Challenges to the Length of Criminal Sentences: Following the Supreme Court "From Precedent 
to Precedent", 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 25, 54 (1985). 
36. Higginbotham, Bureaucracy - The Carcinoma of the Federal Judicio.ry, 31 ALA. L. REV. 261, 
263 (1980). 
37. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 19811 An Essay on Delegation and 
Specialization of the Judicio.l Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 764 (1983). One distinguished com-
mentator described the problem as "near runaway inflation" in the number of cases and personnel. 
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advocacy and decision affords the parties a thorough and uninhibited presen-
tation, and assures the judges a deliberative and collegial performance. The 
ultimate question is whether this generation of judges is presiding over the 
demise of the appellate tradition. 38 
III. PROBLEMS IMAGINED AND REAL 
The question of whether the courts of appeals are so overburdened that they 
have compromised appellate traditions is one that cannot be answered with 
equanimity. Perhaps this and related questions about case load problems cannot 
be answered at all; perhaps only opinions and attitudes can be offered. Through 
use of three techniques - statistics, testimonials and studies - at least, a 
deeper understanding of the problems can be achieved. 
A. Statistics 
Statistics should not be used the way a drunken man uses a lamp post -
for support rather than for illumination. Too often, too much is made of num-
bers. Indeed, federal court fims are like baseball fans; discussing statistics has 
become de riguerur. But the casual fan probably dismisses (the true fan would 
say "overlooks") the numbers as some of the finer points of the game. 39 Still, 
statistics have an important role to play. After all, the very origin of the courts 
of appeals depended on a concern for the volume of appeals in the federal 
system at the turn of the c~:ntury.40 
Many jurists and commentators have relied on statistics to conclude that 
the courts of appeals today labor under such a staggering workload that the 
appellate ideal has been 10st. 41 Present filings are compared with historical figures 
for bold impact. If the 1960's were a time of "exploding dockets,"42 then the 
last twenty years have experienced a docket chain reaction. For example, former 
Meador, The Federal Judiciary - Injlation, Malfunction, and Proposed Course of Action, 1981 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 617, 617-18. 
38. See Carrington, Ceremony and Realism: Demise of Appellate Procedure, 66 A.B.A. J. 860 (1980) 
(suggesting legal realism is to blame). 
39. "A study of the extent of the work of any court is somewhat intriguing - to the judges 
[and a few processors). The members of the Bar may not be altogether bored by it." Evans, A 
Work Sheet of Judicial Labor of Appellate Federal CouTts, 1943 WIS. L. REV. 313, 313. 
40. "Whether a judicial syst<:m needs an intermediate set of appellate courts is determined 
by the volume of judicial business." 9 J. MOORE, W. TAGGERT & J. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL 
PRACTICE 'I 100.01(1), at 3 (2d ed. 1976). 
41. Perhaps, the more fruitful line of inquiry would be to assess the causes and consequences 
of selection of litigation for dispute resolution. Such an approach is beyond the scope of this article. 
See generally P. CARRINCTON, supra note 14, at 4-7; Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What 
We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 
31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 4 (1983); Marcus, Judicial Overload: The Reasons and the Remedies, 28 BUFFALO 
L. REV. 111 (1979); Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 
31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 72 (1983). 
42. Brown, Federal Special Verdicts: The Doubt Eliminator, in Proceedings of the Annual Judicial 
Conference Tenth Judicial Circuit of th.! United States, 44 F.R.D. 245, 338 (1968). 
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Solicitor General McCree observed that in the year 1980 more appeals were 
flied in the Fifth Circuit alone than were flied in all the courts of appeals in 
1940.43 For a second example, consider the analysis of Judge Posner, United 
States Circuit Judge for the Seventh Circuit: 
In the year that ended on June 30, 1981, the number of appeals 
flied in the federal courts of appeals increased by 13.6 percent over the 
number flied in the previous fiscal year. It is now 58.3 percent higher 
than it was as recently as 1975, and more than 400 percent higher than 
it was in 1960.44 
As spectacular as these comparisons are, they may underestimate the effect 
of docket growth. Three other considerations illuminate the comparisons: The 
judge ratio, weighting cases, and the backlog. Consider the judge ratio. The 
number of judges has increased, as has the number of appeals, but the ratio 
has steadily declined.45 In 1940 each circuit judge was personally responsible 
for about sixty decisions. By 1980 the number had grown to 175.46 But even 
those numbers understate the workload of a judge who must sit in three judge 
panels, which in addition to opinion writing require a judge to prepare for and 
participate in the collegiate decision. The following progression illustrates the 
point:47 
Year Appeals Per 3-Iudge Panel 
1940 3,446 184 
1950 2,830 131 
1960 3,899 172 
1970 11,662 361 
1980 23,200 527 
Within this decade, the pace has continued. In 1984 for the first time, the 
number of appeals flied and terminated in the twelve courts of appeals in one 
year exceeded 30,000-more than 700 per 3-judge panel.48 
43. McCree, Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 777, 781 (1981). 
44. Posner, supra note 37, at 761·62. 
45. "[T]he number of courts of appeals judges has increased 94% since 1960, but the number 
of filings in the courts of appeals has multiplied more than nine times in the same period." C. 
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTIGE AND PROCEDURE § 3506, at 25·26 (1984) 
[hereinafter cited as C. WRIGHT]. The ratio change is dramatic computed from either side: "Between 
1961 and 1983, the number of appeals commenced in the United States Courts of Appeals increased 
by 705 percent. The number of authorized judgeships, however, increased by only one hundred 
percent." Martineau, Frivolous Appeals: The Uncerklin Federal Response, 1984 DUKE L.J. 845, 845. 
46. McCree, supra note 43, at 781. 
47. The figures are taken from Rubin, Burt4ucratization of the Federal Courts: The Tension Between 
Justice and Efficiency, 55 NOTRE DAME LAw. 648, 649 n.3 (1980) (citations omitted) and ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, table 
2, at 97 (1983). 
48. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS 106 (1984) [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT]. 
HeinOnline -- 37 U. Fla. L. Rev.  236 1985
236 UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LA W REVIEW [Vol. XXXVII 
The increased complexity of individual cases is a second aspect of caseload 
growth that is difficult to quantify, but which seems intuitively demonstrable. 
Comparing the number of filings and terminations provides a shallow measure 
of workload. More empirical work must be done. 49 Some general agreement 
exists that in the last two decades there have been more "large" cases on 
appeal in terms of parties, issues, difficulty and significance. 50 Judge Nelson, 
United States Circuit Judge of the Ninth Circuit, has estimated that such cases 
have grown at twice the rate of other cases. 51 
A third concern is growth in the backlog. Once again, commentators and 
judges have relied on statistics to achieve a startling effect. 52 The numbers are 
difficult to comprehend. Because such a large number of appeals have been 
filed nationally, the pending caseload is always large. A more sophisticated sense 
of the problem may be gleaned from a breakdown of pending appeals by length 
of time. As of June 30, 1983, these numbers were as follows: 53 
Total 
22,480 
1 to 3 
Months 
7,046 
4 to 6 
Months 
5,064 
7 to 9 
Months 
3,352 
10 to 12 
Months 
2,370 
More than 
12 Months 
4,648 
Thus, 20.7 percent of the appeals pending have been on the docket more than 
a year. 54 Certain courts of appeals are in more serious crisis than others. For 
example, the Ninth Circuit's backlog, one of the largest, has grown from 250 
cases in 1950, to 400 in 1960, to 500 in 1970, to its present 5,000.'5 
49. See generally H. LAWSON & B. GLITNE, WORKLOAD MEASURES IN THE COURT OF ApPEALS 
(1980); W. McLAUCHLAN, FEDERAL COURT CASELOADS (1984); THE CASES OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF ApPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT (1982). 
50. McCree, supra note 43, at 781-82. See generally UNITED STATES COURTS OF ApPEALS WORK-
LOAD STATISTICS FOR THE DECADE OF THE 1970's (Admin. Office of U.S. Courts 1980). 
51. Nelson, Why Are Things Being Done This Way?, JUDCES j., Fall, 1980, at 13, 14. Bid Stt 
Sarat, The Role rif Courts and the Logic rif Court Reform: Notts on the justice Department's Approach to 
Improving justice, 64 JUDICATURE 300 (1981). 
52. See, e.g., Haworth, supra note 10, at 258-59; Lay, A Proposal for Discrttionary Reviav in 
Federal Courts of Appeals, 34 Sw. L.J. 1151, 1151-52 (1981). 
53. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 48, table 7, at 107. 
54. /d. Cases under submission, as of September 30, 1983, tell a similar but less dramatic 
story: 
Total 
765 
3 to 6 
Months 
444 
6 to 9 
Months 
180 
9 to 12 
Months 
83 
More Than 
12 Months 
58 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS DURINC THE TWELVE MONTH PERIOD ENDED SEPTEMBER 
30, 1983, table 4, at 6 (Admin. Office U.S. Courts 1983). In 1984 filings and cases pending 
increaed over the previous year. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 48, at 106. 
55. Nelson, supra note 51, at 13 (citations omitted). See also ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT 9 (1985). 
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B. Testimonials 
Statistics do illuminate the problem. Understandably, much attention has 
been lavished on available statistics. So much so that one is reminded of the 
second drunk, on his hands and knees under the lamp post searching for a 
coin dropped some distance away, who explains he is searching where the light 
is better. The statistical proof is impressive, but in law such proof, though 
usually relevant, is rarely determinative. The statistical conclusion that the prob-
lem is real and is really serious is supported additionally by testimonials. Expert 
witnesses56 help bring "the cold numbers convincingly to life. "57 Nearly every 
article cited in this essay concludes that the workload problem facing the courts 
of appeals has created a crisis that jeopardizes their traditional function and 
role. 58 Prominent government officials agreeing with this position include: Quen-
tin N. Burdick, United States Senator from North Dakota;59 A. Leo Levin, 
Director of the Federal Judicial Center;60 Erwin N. Griswold, former Solicitor 
General;61 Wade H. McCree, former Solicitor General;62 and William French 
Smith, former Attorney General. 63 
The judges agree. A majority of circuit judges in the Second, Fifth and 
District of Columbia Circuits responded affirmatively to the question, "Do you 
feel overloaded and overworked?"64 The best evidence that the courts of appeals' 
case load is no longer manageable is the testimony of the judges themselves.65 
Many prominent circuit judges have agreed publicly: Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
56. FED. R. EVID. 702 (defines an expert witness as one "qualified ... by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education"). 
57. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977). 
58. Contrary commentary can be found, however, although it is decidedly in the minority. 
See generally Edwards, supra note 6. 
59. Burdick, Federal Courts of Appeals: Radical Surgery or Conservative Care, 60 Ky. L.J. 807, 807 
(1972) ("The Federal Courts of Appeals are afilicted with an illness. While it is not malignant, 
there is a potential prognosis of chronic incapacity or partial paralysis. "). 
60. Levin, Adding Appellate Capacity to the Federal System: A National Court of Appeals or an Intercircuit 
Tribunal?, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. I, 2 (1982) ("For well over a decade, legal literature has 
reflected a deep concern with the capacity of the federal judicial system to function smoothly and 
effectively .... "). 
61. Griswold, supra note 10, at 791 ("The problem is a very real one. There can be no 
doubt about that. Those who say there is no problem seem to me to be largely unaware of its 
ramifications and insensitive to its consequences. "). 
62. McCree, supra note 43, at 781 ("Few would dispute that the caseload in the federal 
courts has reached crisis proportions. "). 
63. Smith, The Role of the Federal Courts, 88 CASE & COM. 10, 10 (1983) ("[T]he burdens on 
the courts today are actually effecting a change in the character not only of our federal judicial 
system, but also of the legal profession and society. "). 
64. J. HOWARD, supra note 31, at 264. 
65. See Edwards, supra note 6, at 876 (same observation regarding Supreme Court). Apart 
from their expressions of their own overwork, Supreme Court Justices have been sympathetic to 
the plight of the intermediate tier. See, e.g., Clark, A Commentary of Congestion in the Federal Courts, 
3 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 1 (1976) ("The federal court system now has more work than it can properly 
handle."); Rehnquist, supra note 6, at 4-5 ("The [Supreme] Court cannot review a sufficiently 
significant portion of the decisions of any federal court of appeals. "). 
HeinOnline -- 37 U. Fla. L. Rev.  238 1985
238 UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LA W REVIEW [Vol. XXXVII 
District of Columbia Circuit;66 Clement F. Haynsworth, Fourth Circuit;67 James 
C. Hill, Eleventh Circuit;68 Donald P. Lay, Eighth Circuit;69 Abner J. Mikva, 
District of Columbia Circuit;70 Dorothy W. Nelson, Ninth Circuit;71 Richard 
A. Posner, Seventh Circuit;72 and Alvin B. Rubin, Fifth Circuit. 73 Academics 
long and loud have sung the chorus. 74 
That the crisis likely will continue and probably worsen is a central article 
of the federal court faith. Admittedly, good predictions cannot be made because 
an adequate theory of caseload growth does not exist. 75 One spectacular pre-
diction is that by the twenty-first century 5,000 courts of appeals judges will 
fill 1,000 volumes in the federal reporter disposing of more than 1,000,000 
appeals - each year!76 Whatever the future will bring, this article has carried 
the burden of proof that the federal courts of appeals are in big trouble. 
C. Studies 
The system has not yet reached a gridlock. But reformers should not be so 
irresponsible as to await a complete breakdown. Assuming that the state of the 
dockets of the courts of appeals is now or soon will be intolerable, consideration 
of reforms is immediately appropriate. Appellate reforms may be grouped along 
66. Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independmce, Good Behavior, and Workload of Federal Judges, 55 
U. COLO. L. REV. I, 7 (1983) ("[F]ederal courts today labor under staggering workloads."). 
67. Haynsworth, Improving the Handling of Criminal Cases in the Federal Appellate System, 59 COR-
NELL L. REV. 597, 597 (1974) ("Our federal courts of appeals are in critical condition. "). 
68. Hill & Baker, Dam Federal Jurisdiction!, 32 EMORY L.J. 3, 87 (1983) ("In whole, the flood 
of litigation is not averted. What is needed, to preserve the analogy, is the design and construction 
of a dam equal to the flood. "). 
69. Lay, supra note 52, at 1151 ("[C]ourts of appeals are so inundated by the volume of 
appeals of right [they] can no longer be given the full deliberative process to which they are 
entitled. "). 
70. Mikva, More Judgeships - But Not All at Once, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 23, 23 (1982) 
("Everyone knows by now that the caseload in the federal courts is too high. "). 
71. Nelson, supra note 51, at 13 ("The problem is not just the number of cases but also the 
vast increase in their intricacy.' '). 
72. Posner, supra note 37, at 761 ("[T]he dismal subject of this paper .. .is the growing 
workload of the federal courts of appeals. "). 
73. Rubin, supra note 47, at 649 ("Appellate judges are confronted not only with the same 
vast increase in intricacy of cases but, in addition, with a staggering increase in the volume of 
their work. "). 
74. Su, e.g., P. CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 4; Haworth, Circuit Spiriting and the "New" 
National Court of Appeals: Can the Mouse Roar?, 30 Sw. L.J. 839, 841 (1976); Hellman, supra note 
31, at 938; Meador, Appellate Case Management and Decisional Processes, 61 VA. L. REV. 255, 255 
(1975); Oberman, Coping With Rising Caseload: A New Model of Appellate Review, 46 BROOKLYN L. 
REV. 841, 843 (1980); Schwartz, Th, Other Things That Courts Do, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 438, 438 
(1981); Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in Judicial Administration, 42 TEX. L. REV. 949, 
957 (1964). 
75. Posner, supra note 37, at 764. 
76. Barton, Behind the Legal Exl>losion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 567, 567 (1975). Set generally Daniels, 
Ladders and Bushes: The Problem of Case/oads and Studying Court Activities Over Time, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. 
RESEARCH J. 751. 
HeinOnline -- 37 U. Fla. L. Rev.  239 1985
1985J PROPOSALS TO REFORM UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 239 
three goals: (1) increasing the efficiency of the present capacity; (2) increasing 
the capacity at a constant efficiency; or (3) reducing the allowable demand on 
the system.77 Since the 1960's several efforts have been made to evaluate ef-
ficiency, capacity, and demand. A brief overview of those efforts provides further 
context and identifies the origin of many of the proposals to be discussed.7s 
American Law Institute. The first modem study of federal jurisdiction was the 
idea of Chief Justice Warren. In a 1959 speech to the American Law Institute, 
Warren challenged, "[i]t is essential that we achieve a proper jurisdictional 
balance between the Federal and State court systems assigning to each system 
those cases most appropriate in light of basic principles of federalism."79 The 
ALI Study begun in 1960 was completed in 1968 and published under the title 
Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts.80 This far-
reaching effort focused primarily on the district courts and their major heads 
of jurisdiction. Taking the Chief Justice's theme, the Study sought to redraw 
the federal/state judicial relation "in a rational and contemporarily useful way."SI 
The proposals did not anticipate the burgeoning federal dockets, and the Study 
has little to offer this discussion, except for the demand-reduction proposition 
that a narrowing of federal jurisdiction will decrease the case load demand on 
appellate resources.82 Nothing significant came of the Study,83 and it may be 
dismissed today as academic.8+ 
American Bar Foundation. The American Bar Foundation commissioned the 
first study of the burgeoning appellate caseload.85 Published in 1968, the report, 
entitled Accommorlating the Workload of the United States Courts of Appeals,86 rec-
77. Carrington, supra note 24, at 555. 
78. This summary relies substantially on Meador, supra note 37, at 625-37. See general(y C. 
WRIGHT, supra note 45, S 3510, at· 43·49. 
79. Address by Chief Justice Earl Warren to the 36th Annual Meeting of the American Law 
Institute (May 20, 1959), reprinleti in A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS 27, 33 (1959). 
80. AMERICAN LAw INST. STUDY OF THE DMSroN OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL 
COURTS (Official Draft 1968). 
In the meantime. the Judicial Conference had appointed an ad hoc committee in 1964 to study the 
geographical organization of the federal courts which issued a report recommending adding circuit 
judges and splitting circuits. See generaUy Baker, supra note 7, at 696·97. 
81. Meador, supra note 37, at 625. 
82. But sce Wright, supra note 74. Professor Wright appreciated the problem with characteristic 
foresight. 
83. The proposal was introduced into Congress in 1971 by Senator Burdick and never went 
beyond committee. See general(y S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Federal Court Jurisdiction Act 
of 1971: Continuation of Hearings on S. 1876, Before tFze Suhcomm. of Impro1Jmrenfs in Judicial Machinery 
of the Senale Judiciary Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). Federal Court Jurisdiction Act of 1971: Hearingr 
on S. 1876 Before tFze Suhcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 9Zd 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 
84. Cj. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM xvii (2d ed. 1973) (references to the study); C. WRIGHT, 
THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS xv (4th ed. 1983) (repeated references to- the study). 
85. Burdick, supra note 59, at 813-15. 
86. AMERICAN B. FOUND., ACCOMMODATING THE WORKLOAD OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF 
ApPEALS (1968). 
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om mended some intramural reforms to improve efficiency, recommended an 
increase in capacity and, most importantly, proposed a sequential strategy for 
dealing with federal appellate growth over the long run: 
1. Once a circuit reaches nine judges, the desirability of adding more 
judges must be compared to the most direct alternative, that of splitting 
a circuit to create a new circuit. On balance, it is more desirable to 
add judges than it is to split circuits. 
2. When the number of judges in a given circuit exceeds 15, a 
"division" system should be adopted whereby judges would be assigned 
on a rotating basis to 5 or 7 judge-divisions, with each division having 
responsibility for specific substantive subject matter. Up to 30 judges 
could be accommodated within a given circuit under this "substantive 
divisions" concept. 
3. Eventually some circuits will have to split when the caseload 
exceeds the capacity of the maximum number of judges who can be 
efficiently employed under a "substantive divisions" organization. 
4. Contemporaneously in this evolutionary process there will be the 
need to furnish assistance to the Supreme Court in its function of guiding 
and harmonizing the federal law decided by the Courts of Appeals. Such 
assistance could be furnished alternatively by regional appellate panels 
of the Courts of Appeals, by appellate panels with jurisdiction over spe-
cific matter, or by a "national circuit. "87 
Much of this sequential scenario has come to pass and, as will become apparent, 
the rest remains viable. 
The Freund Committee. The Report of the Study Group on the Case/oad of the Supreme 
Court was published in 1972.88 Commissioned by the Federal Judicial Center, 
the Study Group of jurists, scholars, and attorneys came to be known by the 
name of its chair, Professor Paul Freund. As its title suggests, the study focused 
on the problems of the Supreme Court. 89 The Freund Committee recommended 
several efficiency measures, such as the elimination of both the three-judge 
district courts and the Supreme Court's obligatory jurisdiction. However, a 
87. Burdick, supra note 59, at 814. See generally Carrington, supra note 24 (Professor Carrington 
was the Project Director). 
88. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE 
SUPREME COURT, reprinted at 57 F.R.D. 573 (1972) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTERj. 
89. The judicial Center was created in 1968 to "research and study ... the operation of the 
courts of the United States." Act of Dec. 20, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-219, § 620, 81 Stat. 664, 
734. Chief justice Burger, as Chairman of the Board, appointed the Group to "study the caseload 
of the Supreme Court and to make such recommendations as its findings warranted." FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 88, at i:<. 
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hailstorm of controversy resulted from a capacity-reform suggesting the creation 
of a national court of appeals. 9O Briefly summarized, the proposed court would 
be staffed by seven circuit judges sitting for staggered three year terms. The 
court would screen all certiorari petitions and appeals and refer about 500 to 
the Supreme Court for the Court's selection of the 150-200 for full decision. 
Additionally, the court would retain and decide genuine conflicts among the 
circuits. Criticism centered on two themes: a concern for the dilution of Su-
preme Court authority and self-determinism, and a desire to preserve direct 
access to the Supreme Court. Seen by some as an attack on the Supreme Court 
itself, the proposal was "stillborn," to borrow the diagnosis of a midwife of 
federal court reform.91 The episode did focus attention on the federal appellate 
court system and its problems, however, and served to establish some important 
political limits on the dialogue of reform. 92 
The Hruska Commission. Responding to the collective urgings of Chief Justice 
Burger, the Chief Judges of all the courts of appeals, the Judicial Conference 
of the United States, the Federal Judicial Center, and the American Bar As-
sociation, Congress created the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court 
Appellate System in 1972.93 Chaired by Senator Hruska, the Commission in-
cluded foursomes from the Senate, the House, the Chief Justice's appointments, 
and the President's appointments. The legislative charge was broad, but non-
jurisdictional: study the federal judicial system's geographical divisions, struc-
ture, and internal procedures, and recommend changes "most appropriate for 
the expeditious and effective disposition of judicial business.94 
In 1973 the Commission issued its first report recommending the division 
of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits.95 This report was largely an efficiency reform. 
Two years later, the Commission issued its second report, which considered 
structure and internal procedures of the federal appellate courtS.96 Again, the 
capacity-reform of the creation of a national court of appeals was suggested.97 
To be inserted between the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, the 
proposed court would be staffed permanently with seven article III judges. It 
90. The commentary was hot and heavy. For a partial bibliography, see Domecus, Congressional 
Prerogatives, The Constitution and a National Court oj Appeals, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 715, 716 n.7 
(1978); Wallace, The Nature and Extent oj Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed for a Mountain or a 
Molehill?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 913, 914 n.9 (1983). See also C. WRIGHT, supra note 45, § 3510, at 
46 n.9; Meador, supra note 37, at 627 n.59. 
91. Meador, supra note 37, at 627. 
92. Id. 
93. Act of October 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807. See generally CONF. REP. 
No. 1457, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3611; S. REP. 
No. 930, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3602, 3605-
06. 
94. Act of October 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807. 
95. Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, The Geographical Boundaries 
oj the Several Judicial Circuits: Recommendations for Change, 62 F.R.D. 223 (1973). 
96. Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and Internal 
Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975). 
97. Id. at 237-47. 
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would not perform any screening duties, but would decide cases on the reference 
of the Supreme Court and by transfer from the existing appellate courts. It 
would be subject to review in the Supreme Court on certiorari. Aside from the 
split of the Fifth Circuit,98 the Hruska Commission proposals did not fare well 
in the legislative halls. 99 They did garner much attention within the ivy-covered 
walls, both favorable and unfavorable. 100 
Advisory Council on Appellate Justice. This poorly publicized Council was a 
nongovernmental body created in 1971 as a liaison to the Federal Judicial Center 
and the National Center for State Courts. 101 After a four-year study, this council 
of judges, lawyers, and law professors developed guidelines for restructuring the 
federal appellate system much in line with the Hruska Commission, which 
overshadowed the Council. 102 
American Bar Association. The A.B.A. generally supported the Hruska Com-
mission.103 In 1978 the A.B.A. created the Action Commission to Reduce Court 
Costs and Delay, which developed a package of appellate reforms to expedite 
the disposition of appeals. 104 Its intramural proposals are concerned exclusively 
with appeal processing efficiency. lOS 
The Department of Justice. Appointed by then Attorney General Levi, a com-
mittee within the Department of Justice, chaired by then Solicitor General Bork, 
surveyed the problems of the federal courts and issued a report in 1977. 106 The 
Report emphasized the problems of the federal system and made several rec-
ommendations: The abolition of diversity jurisdiction; the creation of admin-
istrative courts under article 1 for adjudication and appeals under most federal 
regulatory laws; the elimination of the Supreme Court's obligatory jurisdiction; 
and the creation of a permanent interbranch "Council on Federal Courts" to 
plan and coordinate judicial reforms. Because of the change in administrations, 
however, the proposals failed to gain momentum.107 In 1977 Attorney General 
Bell established a new unit within the Department called the Office for Im-
98. Set generally Baker, supra note 7. 
99. The proposals were introduced, but never considered. S. 2763, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1975); S. 2762, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 11,219, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 
11,218, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See generally Meador, supra note 37, at 628. 
100. See, e.g., Domecus, supra note 90 (favorable); Haworth & Meador, A Proposed New Federal 
Intermediate Appellate Court, U. MICH. J.L. REF. 201 (1978) (favorable); Hruska, The Commission on 
Revision of the Federal Court Appellate S)Stem: A Legislative History, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 579 (favorable); 
Swygert, The Proposed National Court f!! Appeals: A Threat to Judicial Symmetry, 51 IND. L.J. 327 (1976) 
(unfavorable). 
101. Meador, supra note 37, at 628-29. 
102. /d. 
103. Id. at 629. 
104. Hufstedler & Nejelski, ABA Action Commission Challenges LitIgatIOn Cost and Delay, 66 A.B.A. 
J. 965 (1980). 
105. See generally Weisberger, Appellate Courts: The Challenge of Inundation, 31 AM. U.L. REV. 
237 (1982). 
106. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE COMM. ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM, THE NEEDS 
OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (1977). 
107. Meador, supra note 37, at 630-31. 
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provements in the Administration of Justice. lOs The Office was designed to 
develop and promote court reforms. It achieved a fair degree of legislative 
success. 109 
These various studies have been complemented by congressional attention, 110 
judicial self-improvement, III and the insights of dozens of commentators on the 
federal judicial scene. 1I2 The conclusion seems inescapable that the federal ju-
diciary is under serious stress at the appellate level. These studies confirm that. 
some extramural structural reform is necessary. A better confirmation, however, 
may be found in the courts' own reactions to the stress and the effect this has 
had on the ideal system function and process imperative. 
IV. INTRAMURAL REFORM 
As summarized above, the federal appellate system has been under pressure 
for some time now. Like a living organism, the system has adapted to those 
stresses. Without such adaptations, the system would not have survived. The 
evolution, however, has seriously compromised the ideal and function of the 
system. Furthermore, judicial reforms, labeled here as "intramural reforms," 
appear to be nearly complete. 
Intramural reforms are measures that adapt the procedures for performing 
the accepted appellate role and function described for the federal system. They 
amount to shortcuts, to an abbreviated process justified by the press of docket. 
For convenience, intramural reforms have been grouped by appellate function: 
oral argument, briefmg, opinion writing, case management, support staff, and mis-
cellaneous proposals. 
A. Oral Argument 
The external stress of caseload has changed oral argument practices dra-
matically. The theory for this change was ably stated in a syllogism by Chief 
Judge Godbold of the Eleventh Circuit. JJ3 First, appellate cases are not fungible, 
and courts can articulate and apply differentiating standards and procedures. 
Second, judicial resources are finite, and caseload demand outstrips supply and 
will continue to do so. Thus, the logic goes, an appellate court should be granted 
the discretion to choose not to hear oral arguments in some ~ppeals. IH 
As amended in 1979, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34 provides for 
oral argument "in all cases" unless, under a local rule, a three-judge panel 
108. See 42 Fed. Reg. 8140 (1977). 
109. See, e.g., The F.ederal Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643 (amending 
28 U.S.C. S 631-636, 604(d)(3) & 1915 (1976»; 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (1976); Federal Courts Improvement 
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. 
110. See Meador, supra note 37, at 634-36. 
111. See id. at 637. 
112. See id. at 629-30 nn.69-81 (citations). 
113. See generally Godbold, Improvements in Appellate Procedure: Bdter Use of Available Facilities, 66 
A.B.A. J. 863 (1980). 
114. !d. at 864. 
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unanimously agrees it is not needed. 115 The local rule must articulate a standard 
that establishes oral argument as the norm. Three situations justify an exception 
to the norm: "( 1) the appeal is frivolous; (2) the dispositive issue or set of 
issues has been recently authoritatively decided; or (3) the facts and legal ar-
guments are adequately presented in the briefs and record and the decisional 
process would not be significantly aided by oral argument." 116 This Rule is an 
improvement over some preexisting local rules that provided a power to deny 
oral argument whenever the "case is of such character as not to justify oral 
argument." I J7 Such a standardless approach permitted a panel, a judge, or even 
a law clerk to deny oral argument by intuition. 118 
Perhaps because denial of oral argument is against the American appellate 
tradition, local practices typically limit the power further. Present Eleventh Cir-
cuit Local Rule 23 is fairly typical. 119 Under this Rule, a screening panel (three 
judges assigned together for a year) must unanimously classify a case for the 
nonargument calendar. At an y time prior to decision any of the three judges 
can reclassify for the oral argument calendar, without explanation. Additionally, 
the decision on the merits must be unanimous and without special concurring 
or dissenting opinions unless all the parties agree to nonargument. 
Nationwide, between forty and fifty percent of the appeals decided by the 
courts of appeals in recent years have been decided without oral argument. 12(1 
The savings in judicial resources and private litigants' resources are supposedly 
apparent. Chief Judge Godbold concludes: 
In a simple case in which the result is clear and no close or significant 
issues of law are involved, transporting counsel to the place of holding 
court and paying them for attendance is a waste of societal assets in a 
world where there are other priorities .... Perhaps most important of all, 
the appellate court's function and value are demeaned by requiring it 
to carry out acts merely ceremonial, while pretending the facade is real. 121 
Arguably, in many instances the cases involving settled principles may get even 
closer attention in determining whether they can be discarded summarily. Each 
judge will consider the issue in chambers through use of a draft opinion rather 
than by a cursory discussion after a truncated argument. 
115. FED. R. App. P. 34(a). The amendment codified the prevailing practice among the courts 
of appeals. The Fifth Circuit had begun experimenting with a nonargument summary calendar in 
the late 1960's as one means of coping with the burgeoning caseload. See generally Haworth, supra 
note 74, at 865-67; Haworth, supra note 10, at 265-69. 
116. FED. R. App. P. 34(a). 
117. Haworth, supra note 74, at 866. 
118. !d. 
119. See 11TH CIR. R. 23. See gentTally G. RAHDERT & L. ROTH, ApPEALS TO THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
MANUAL ch. 14, at 3-5 (1977); Godbold, supra note 113. 
120. The percentage hovers above 40 percent. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 48, at 114. Set 
also Edwards, supra note 6, at 894. 
121. See Godbold, supra note 113, at 865. 
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Even such an enlightened procedure must, however, generate some pol-
icy objections.122 Oral argument is not necessary in all cases, but it should 
be permitted in more than half of the cases. Several reasons support this po-
sition. First, the court time saved by eliminating oral argument is relatively 
small. The amount of time an appellate judge spends preparing for and con-
ducting oral argument is not great, even when multiplied by three to account 
for the panel. Indeed, the missed opportunity to test and confirm a theory of 
the case may result in a longer decision time. 123 Second, the government should 
be reluctant to step in to save private resources. The invisible hand of the 
market is more trustworthy than a robed planner. Nonargument could remain 
a private option when the appellant makes the choice or the parties agree. That 
would be a market allocation. But the real cost of the lost oral argument is in 
terms of legitimating the judicial function, establishing communication between 
bench and bar and allowing judges the opportunity to ask questions and thought-
fully focus pn the major issues. 124 The real value of oral argument lies in the 
legitimating function of allowing the litigants to address the decisionmaker face-
to-face. Wholesale denial of oral argument represents a greater threat to the 
progress toward the appellate ideal. 125 
Both the dilemma and its resolution are unattractive. In many cases, a 
practice of considerable importance to the appellate function has been elimi-
nated, at least in part, to preserve its use in other cases in which it is deemed 
more useful. 126 In the process, the federal court system has moved farther away 
from the ideal. Oral argument should not be an absolute right, but the denial 
rate has outgrown the justification for denial. Not surprisingly, an inverse pro-
portion has arisen between the reversal rate and the growth in the nonargument 
calendar.127 Furthermore, when Congress has added judges in the past, the 
non argument calendar has remained constant. One possible explanation is that, 
under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a), almost half of the federal 
appeals are "(1) frivolous" or "(2) unauthoritative." A more likely explanation, 
however, is that the catch-all "(3) adequate briefing and insignificant for oral 
argument" is being used to establish a docket median below which expediency 
permits below average process. This suggestion is troubling. The experience of 
the Second Circuit, which alone among the courts of appeals provides oral 
argument as a matter of course despite a large docket, is a final example that 
122. Courts have steadfastly rejected constitutional due process challenges to the practice. Ste, 
e.g., George W.B. Bryson & Co. v. Norton Lilly & Co., 502 F.2d 1045, 1048-51 (5th Cir. 1974); 
Huth v. Southern Pac. Co., 417 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1969); Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 
406 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir.), em. denied, 394 U.S. 1012 (1969). 
123. Carrington, supra note 24, at 558. 
124. See generally Washy, 17ze Functions and Importance of Appellate Oral Argument: Some Views of 
Lawyers and Federal Judges, 65 JUDICATURE 340, 344-48 (1982). 
125. See supra notes 13-38 and accompanying text. See also P. CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 
25. 
126. Washy, supra note 124, at 342, 353. 
127. See Haworth, supra note 74, at 867. 
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the other federal courts of appeals have been too hasty In eliminating oral 
arguments. '2B 
B. Briefs 
The federal appellate courts have thus reduced oral argument dramatically 
in an effort to cope with increased filings. In making that choice, the courts 
have necessarily emphasized the importance of written presentation. Written 
briefs have several inherent advantages. '29 Written submissions have an "ab-
sorption advantage" over the oral presentation, which is said and gone. '30 In 
a process with a written opinion as an end product, the briefs serve as raw 
material. Briefs ·also are portable and convenient. Moreover, a common attitude 
exists among lawyers and judges that the brief is generally better prepared than 
the oral argument. 131 
Some experts would deemphasize briefs, however, because they feel that oral 
argument is more conducive to process imperatives. '32 The idea of completely 
dispensing with briefs goes a bit too far, although that is the English tradition 
and was the early American experience.133 More realistically, the idea of an 
oral calendar would allow fOI· short written submissions - true "briefs." The 
Ninth Circuit has experimented with such a program on a voluntary basis.'34 
With this approach, written submissions are very short and filing time is greatly 
reduced. The oral argument session becomes the arena for presentation, ad-
vocacy, and decision.135 While this approach seems feasible, experience is lim-
ited. This is due largely to the implicit rejection of a briefing deemphasis in 
the more common nonargument calendar which chooses to deemphasize orality. 
Perhaps not enough has been done to test this implicit choice. 136 
C. Opinions 
Other ways of dealing with delay and backlog include reducing the length 
of opinions, even eliminating some opinions altogether, and selectively pub-
128. See J. HOWARD, supra note 31, at 23-27. Reliance is qualified by the admission that more 
than three-fourths of the docket comes from New York City so that only a taxi ride to the courthouse 
is involved and oral arguments are five or ten minute exchanges. 
129. P. CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 25-27. 
130. While most courts record oral arguments, one may question whether the judges replay 
the tapes or whether the practice is designed chiefly to aid the absent law clerk in later drafting 
an opinion. The tapes become significant, if at all, on the issue of concessions or stipulations. Ste 
5TH CIR. R. 34.7 (tape recordings are for the exclusive use of court). 
131. See Wasby, supra note 124, at 348-53. 
132. P. CARRINGTON, supra not(, 14, at 26. 
133. !d. at 27-28. 
134. For a description, see Chapper, Fast, Faster, Fastest; Appellate Courts Develop Special Tracks 
to Fight Delay, JUDGES' J., Spring 1981, at 50, 56. See also J. CECIL, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
IN A LARGE ApPELLATE COURT: THF. NINTH CIRCUIT INNOVATIONS PROJECT 46-79 (1985). 
135. See Chapper & Hanson, Expedited Procedures for Appellate Courts: Evidence from California's 
Third District Court of Appeal, 42 Mr,. L. REV. 696, 697-98 (1983). 
136. See infra text accompanying notes 272-74. 
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lishing opinions. 137 The approaches are related because the unpublished opinion 
frequently is shorter than the published variety. How this appellate function is 
performed is decidedly important in the allocation of judicial resources because 
nearly one-half of a judge's time involves opinion preparation. 138 This reality 
attracts reformers to the opinion writing process. 
Although the art of good opinion writing should be encouraged, not every 
record on appeal presents a canvas deserving of a masterpiece. 139 Too much 
of the appellate process is lost, however, unless the artist is obligated to apply 
at least a few brushstrokes beyond the signature. The very integrity of the 
appellate process requires that courts state their reasons. l40 The appellate ideal 
and system function described earlier make explicit this basic assumption of the 
common law tradition of deciding appeals. HI Quantity/quality tradeoffs are fre-
quently argued and, properly, have been pursued, because opinion writing is 
the most labor intensive feature of the appellate process. 
An opinion serves three critical purposes. 142 First, litigants and the public 
are assured the decision is the product of reasoned judgment and thoughtful 
evaluation rather than the mere exercise of whim and caprice. Second, the very 
writing of an opinion reinforces the decisionmaking and ensures correctness. 
Third, appellate opinions are the lifestream of the common law, for they create 
precedents. 
The first purpose may be partly served without an opinion in every appeal. 
Granted, there would be sufficient writing to assure the general public that the 
courts are not acting altogether arbitrarily or casually.H3 But neither the general 
public nor the particular litigants would have that assurance in the given opin-
ionless decision. Litigants seem especially deserving of an explanation. l44 Of 
course, arbitrariness can always be covered by an opinion, but that much cy-
nicism obliges a belief in affirmative deceit not just arbitrariness, and a writing 
requirement does confme arbitrariness. 
The second purpose for requiring a written statement in all cases is to ensure 
an important discipline for decision. A decisionmaker who must reason through 
137. Much has been written on the subject. For a selective bibliography, see generally C. 
BOLDEN, ApPELLATE OPINION PREPARATION - A SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY AND SURVEY 17-21 (1978). 
138. See Haworth, supra note 74, at 867-68. 
139. See Younger, On JudidaI Opinions Considered as One oj the Five Arts: The Coen Lecture, 51 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 341 (1980). But see Vining, Justice Bureaucracy and Legal Writing, 80 MICH. L. REV. 
248 (1981). 
140. P. CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 31. See general{y Ginsburg, supra note 1. 
141. See supra text accompanying notes 13-38. 
142. See general{y Merrill, Could Judges Deliver MOTe Justice if They Wrote Fewer Opinions?, 64 
JUDICATURE 435 (1981). 
143. Id. at 435. 
144. This is not to suggest that litigants have a constitutional right to a written opinion, but 
a decision on the record and a statement of reasons is part and parcel of the procedural due 
process that courts impose on the other branches, as a general matter of hornbook law. See J. 
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 555-56 (2d ed. 1984); Friendly, "Some 
Kind oj a Hearing", 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279-95 (1975). See also infra note 149. 
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to a conclusion in print has reasoned in fact. Misconceptions and oversights of 
fact and law are discoverable in the process of writing. Everyone familiar with 
the appellate process has heard and used the expression, "It will not write that 
way" to mean that a tentative vote will not withstand the careful discipline of 
record reading, legal research, and opinion drafting. Yet, without a writing 
requirement some tentative votes would escape such scrutiny. Abstractly, opin-
ion writing prolongs the process and, on occasion, a correct decision that has 
been unduly delayed may be as detrimental as an incorrect decision.145 The 
answer to this criticism is to expedite the exceptional case for quick hearing 
and decision with a brief opinion. 146 In the balance of interests involved, the 
value of self-restraint provided by writing deserves greater weight than the value 
of efficiency gained through decision by edict. Reasoned decision is possible 
without writing, but sufficiently less likely that the writing requirement should be 
preserved at almost all costs. More marginal resources should be spent in de-
ciding when to write than in giving each decision its writing due. 
The third purpose of writing is most important of all because of the tra-
ditional importance of precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis.147 A deciding 
panel participates in a dialogue that is both backward and fonvard looking, 
both inwardly and outwardly directed, and both upwardly and downwardly 
important. 148 A decision builds on past decisions and shapes future decisions. 
An appellate judgment decides a particular controversy and guides the resolution 
of later controversies. The court of appeals supervises the district court and is 
supervised, in turn, by the Supreme Court. In all these relationships, the court 
of appeals must communicate its reasoning to perform its role. An expression 
of reasoning will always contribute to the body of precedent or usefully inform 
the Supreme Court. 149 
The consensus has been that litigants are entitled, as a matter of policy, to 
some statement of reasons for a decision. 150 The courts of appeals have violated 
this consensus by providing for and rendering judgments without any opinion. 
A Fifth Circuit innovation, 151 the practice is anathema to the appellate function 
145. Merrill, supra note 142, at 435. 
146. Set, e.g., 4TH CIR. R. 345 (expediting appeals). Indeed, on occasion it might be ap-
propriate to announce a decision with an opinion to follow. 
147. Baker, supra note 7, at 712. 
148. Ste id. at 712-13, 731-34. 
149. Merrill, supra note 142, at 435. The Supreme Court is hampered in the perfonnance of 
its role when forced to review an opinionless decision. See Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 
194 n.4 (1972), vacating 457 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1971). In this regard, the California Supreme 
Court's practice of ordering depublication (not printed in the official reports) of particular opinions 
of the state intermediate court is extraordinary. Ste generally Grodin, The Depublication Practice of the 
California Supreme Court, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 514 (1984). 
150. Haworth, supra note 74, at 868. 
151. Ste NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, Local 990, 430 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1970). 
See generally Shuchman & Gelfand, The Use of Local Rule 21 in the Fifth Circuit: Can Judges Stlect Cases 
of "No Precedential Value"?, 29 EMORY L.J. 195 (1980). The Supreme Court, before and since, has 
used the technique to cope with docket volume. Ste R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT 
PRACTICE § 428, at 317-21 (5th ed. 1978). 
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and role previously described. 152 Avowedly never used to finesse or hide 
a difficult issue, 153 an affirmance without opinion is permissible by local 
rule if: (1) the findings of fact are not clearly erroneous; or (2) the 
evidence supporting the jury's verdict is not insufficient; or (3) substantial 
evidence on the record as a whole supports an agency's order; and (4) 
"the Court also determines that no error of law appears and' an opinion 
would have no precedential value .... "154 
Initially justified soley as self-defense against the threat of a Fifth Circuit 
docket disaster, the number of affirmance-without-opinion dispositions has 
decreased over the years, and the judges have begun to use the technique 
differently.155 In 1977 slightly more than one-half of the nonargument cal-
endar cases and about ten percent of the oral argument calendar cases 
were decided without opinion. By 1983 the nonargument calendar use had 
fallen to less than three percent and the oral argument calendar use had 
remained at seven percent. Judges have apparently receded from their initial 
enthusiasm and the technique remains most useful in cases in which oral 
argument confirms that no issue is in doubt. In these cases, a notice is 
sent to. counsel after argument that in effect classifies the appeal as virtually 
frivolous. 
Nevertheless, the appropriate accommodation of the competing interests 
requires some form of written opinion. Insufficient attention has been given 
to the abridged opinion, a written opinion primarily addressed to the par-
ties, which identifies the issue on appeal, announces the court's disposition, 
and gives the principled basis for the ruling. 156 Given the narrow audience, 
the facts and procedural history can be omitted. 157 Less important and less 
complete, these opinions would naturally have less precedential impact, but 
not by the artifice of declaring "nonprecedential precedents." 158 Standards 
for non argument calendar selection and for affirmance without opinion dis-
position have alreadly been articulated. Strangely, similar criteria and a 
uniform practice concerning the simple, traditional per curiam opinion are 
not available. Such a device would provide a "useful economy" in the 
majority of federal appeals. 159 Criticisms of long opinion writing come not 
just from the ivory tower, but from the bench as well. For example, Judge 
Rubin, United States Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit, has recently chal-
152. Se4 supra text accompanying notes 13-38. 
153. NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, Local 990, 430 F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir. 1970). 
154. 5TH CIR. R. 47.6. See FED. R. App. P. 47. 
155. Figures cited here are from G. RAHDERT & L. ROTH, supra note 119, ch. 2, at 25 n.92. 
156. Wald, supra note 29, at 782. 
157. !d. See also P. CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 33-35. 
158. "I think all I am speaking about is ... a nonprecedential precedent." Hearings Before the 
Comm'n on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System 2d Phase 537 (1974-75) (testimony of Judge 
Robert Sprecher), quoted in Reynolds & Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent - Limited Publication 
and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Apptals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1167 (1978). 
159. Carrington, supra note 24, at 559. 
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lenged the judges to spend less time worrying about the scholarly nature 
of their opinions. 160 
, Admittedly, the shorter opinion is not always easier to write, and many a wag has 
made the point. 161 The memorandum per curiam should be the standard, with the 
scholarly exegisis saved for the truly deserving decision. The time and resources 
saved by this shift in emphasis would not be limited to the actual drafting, but would 
also extend to future drafting and to efforts to stay abreast of the law. 
For expediency, memorandum opinions could even be dictated in open court 
with only a little extra preparation in those cases in which oral argument reveals 
no issues in doubt. 162 This procedure might not save much time over the mem-
orandum opinion. Yet, the Second Circuit has used the oral per curiam opinion 
in a useful way for those cases in which the court is performing only a dispute 
resolution function and not a law generation function. However, the Second 
Circuit experience is not readily transferable because oral argument is guar-
anteed in each case and substantial central staff resources are used to settle 
appeals and monitor case flow, but not used in the decisional process. 163 Fur-
thermore, this Second Circuit practice reportedly has diminished markedly, and 
apparently for good reason. When an oral per curiam is delivered, the other 
members of the panel are reluctant to suggest changes, corrections, or additions. 
Circulation of a written opinion allows for more give and take. At bottom, the 
process of deciding an appeal without an opinion suffers from the fact that no 
standard or rule effectively limits the practice to truly frivolous cases. The reality 
is that the courts of appeals are silently deciding appeals that twenty years ago 
would have been thought to merit a full opinion. 164 That reality is at odds with 
the appellate ideal and the proper concept of role. This is one example where 
the courts of appeals have pursued efficiency at too high a price. 
Whether to publish the proposed memorandum per curiam opinions and, 
if not, whether to allow ci.tation to unpublished opinions are two questions 
160. American judicial opinions surpass in verbiage, in length and in citation those written 
anywhere else in the world. , .. Occasionally each of us may render a decision, perhaps 
in a highly significant case, that demands exposition of the fuJI palette of our talents, but 
I fear that much of our time and the time of our clerks is spent merely in seeking felicitous 
expression, adding citations and attempting to produce works of art. It would be worthwhile 
for judges to experiment with much simpler opinion models. We will succeed, however, 
only if we de-institutionalize the demand for scholarly opinions. A good motto for us might 
be: Sufficient unto the case is the decision thereof. 
Rubin, Management Problems in the Federal Courts: Curbing Bureaucratization and Reducing 
Other Tensions Between Justice and Efficiency, quoted in Nelson, supra note 51, at 15 n.7, Set also 
Gardner, Toward Shorter Opinions, 55 CAL. ST. B.J. 240 (1980); Wald, supra note 29, at 782-83, 
161. "I have made this lett('r longer than usual because I lack the time to make it shorter." 
B. PASCAL, PROVENTIAL LETTERS XVI, quoted in Hayes v, Solonion, 597 F.2d 958, 986 n.22 (5th 
Cir. 1979), em. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980). 
162. Lumbard, Current Prohl.77IS of the Fedn-al Courts of Appeals, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 29, 37-38 
(1968). 
163. Oberman, supra note 74, at 851-52. Some court-watchers suggest that the Second Circuit 
does use staff resources in the decisional process in certain categories of appeals. Two examples 
are habeas and prisoner petition cases. Oral argument is rare in such cases even in the Second 
Circuit. 
164. Edwards, supra note 6. at 895. 
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distinct. These are not new questions, limited to the burdened courts of appeals. 
As long as common law courts have decided appeals, debate has persisted 
concerning limited publication of opinions. In times of docket growth, however, 
the rhetoric becomes more shrill. 165 In perspective, the published opinion is the 
centerpiece in· the courts of appeals' performance of role and the function of 
precedent. l66 Historically, limited publication has been the rule both in England 
and in this country, with control of selection and content in the hands of private 
concerns. Today, the West Publishing Company routinely publishes all opinions 
provided under the publication policy in each circuit. 167 The modern issue is 
whether judges should have control over the selection of opinions for publication 
and citation, and, if so, by what standards. 168 
Each of the circuits has its own limited publication/no citation plan, all of 
which share a common purpose but vary in their particulars. 169 Limited pub-
lication means just that: The panel decides not to publish some opinions beyond 
communication to the litigants. Non-citation is just as literal a component of 
the typical plan. Once some opinions go unreported, the next question is whether 
the unpublished opinion may be cited to the court or by the court. 170 The 
arguments for and against the policy are telling. 171 Proponents of a non-citation 
rule argue: (1) unpublished opinions are written for the litigants only and would 
require substantial refinement to merit wider distribution; (2) if citation were 
permitted, a black market in unreported opinions would develop, which would 
frustrate part of the reason for nonpublication; (3) access would necessarily be 
unequal, as for example, between iJ!stitutional litigators who could maintain an 
opinion bank and private persons; (4) properly unpublished opinions represent 
mere applications of settled principles, adding nothing but volume to the prec-
edent stream. Opponents of a non-citation plan argue that citation is necessary 
to the rule of stare decisis. Today's practice decidedly follows the proponents' 
165. [U)nIimited proliferation of published opinions constitutes a burden and a threat to 
a cohesive body of law ...• [T)here are limits on the capacity of judges and lawyers to 
produce, research and assimilate the sheer mass of judicial opinions. These limits are 
dangerously near at present and in some systems may already be exceeded. . . . Common 
law in the United States could be crushed by its own weight if present trends continue 
unabated. 
Joiner, Limiting PuhlicaJion oj Judicial Opinions, 56 JUDICATURE 195, 196 (1972). 
166. Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation oj Limited PublicaJion in the United States Courts oj Appeals: 
The Price oj Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 575-77 (1981). 
167. [d. 
168. !d. at 577. Conflict may arise between court and publisher. See United States v. Kilpatrick, 
570 F. Supp. 505 (D. Colo. 1983); N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1984, at 1, col. Oustice Dep't obtains 
temporary order barring opinion from West Publishing Company's Federal Supplement). 
169. See generally Black, Hide and Seek Precedent: Phantom Opinions in Ohio, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 
477, 478 n.4 (1981); Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 218-24; Oberman, supra note 74, at 851 n.56 (1980), 
Note, Unreported Decisions in the United States Courts oj Appeals, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 128 (1977). 
170. See generally Walther, The Noncitation Rule and the Concept of Stare Decisis, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 
581 (1978). 
171. P. CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 37; Haworth, supra note 74, at 868-70; Note, supra 
note 169, at 145-46. 
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view that a no-citation rule is part and parcel of a limited publication plan. J72 
If the purpose of the limited publication rule is to lower the costs of producing 
and consuming appellate decisions, a no-citation limitation should follow. 173 The 
more difficult question is whether the non publication approach is appropriate. 
Federal developments concerning nonpublication may be summarized briefly. m 
In 1964 the Judicial Conference of the United States formally resolved that 
publication would be reserved for those opinions having "general precedential 
value."175 In 1972 the Federal Judicial Center and the Judicial Conference 
requested each court of appeals to develop a limited publication/no-citation plan. 176 
Little has changed since the establishment of each circuit as a laboratory.177 
The debate over limited publication/no-citation plans centers on three as-
sumptions: (1) full publication is not a necessary element of the appellate 
function; (2) the costs of full publication outweigh the benefits; and (3) judges 
can and will properly distinguish between the publishable and the not publish-
able. '78 An opinion performs double duty, of course. As a mandate, an opinion 
adds substantially to the finality of the judicial resolution of the dispute between 
the party litigants. As a unit of precedent, an opinion makes law. The argument 
goes that some appellate decisions perform only the first and not the second 
duty when the appeal calls for the application of well-settled principles. In a 
very practical way, the view one takes reflects one or another philosophy of 
law. On one level, courts of appeals generate headnotes arranged under Key 
Numbers. The decision is then catalogued under the Key Number for some 
future invocation. The principle is the thing. On another level, actual appli-
cations of earlier established principles demonstrate those principles and describe 
their effective content. The application is the thing. How one answers the 
question, "Which is the real thing?" decides whether the appellate presumption 
is for or against publication; whether in other words, full publication is a 
necessary element. 179 Appellate decisionmaking involves more than merely ar-
ticulating and applying doctrine. Law, and appellate decisionmaking as a pure 
form of law, is and always will be more an art than a science. To understand, 
one must know how and why the Court's political power is being exercised. 
In regard to the second assumption, the advocates of a limited publication/ 
no-citation plan conclude that costs of full publication are so high that selective 
publication is preferable. Admittedly, the resource costs of opinion preparation 
are increased marginally for editing for publication, which presumably would 
172. Haworth, supra note 74, at 869-70. 
173. Reynolds & Richma'l, supra note 158, at 1186. 
174. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 166, at 577-79. 
175. 1964 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES REPORT 11. Interestingly, the resolution 
went on to urge "that opinions authorized to be published be succinct." /d. See supra text accom-
panying notes 156-64. 
176. 1972 JUDICIAL CONFERENGE OF THE UNITED STATES REPORT 33. 
177. See 1974 JUDICIAL CONFEIlENCE OF THE UNITED STATES REPORT 12. See gena-ally Reynolds 
& Richman. supra note 166, at 573-79. 
178. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 166, at 57Y. 
179. /d. at 579-80. 
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not be done "just" for the litigants. Some pride and all concerns for future 
application are eliminated with a non-published, non-citable opinion. These costs 
are difficult to quantify, however, and seem somewhat speculative. Furthermore, 
the proposed memorandum opinion device - "sufficient unto the case" -
would avoid these costs, if only as a matter of self-restraint. 
Concerns for costs to captive readers and purchasers also gain the attention 
of nonpublication proponents. 180 Library expenses increase with volume. Read-
ership includes judges and courts who must apply precedents, scholars who 
must perform as critics, and advocates who must advise clients and write briefs. 
These concerns are not convincing because system collapse is not imminent, 
and because unprincipled nonpublication poses a more decided threat to the 
appellate ideal. The "flood of opinions" argument has been around for hundreds 
of years, yet private sector accommodations and specializations continue to cope. 181 
Even if all the arguments in favor of nonpublication are accepted, the prac-
tice has grave consequences. The appellate ideal contemplates such a central 
role for the published opinion that a two-tracked system is a different system. 
In a profession that judges itself by the appearance of impropriety, limited 
publication appears at odds with accepted appellate tradition. Suspicions and 
accusations spring to mind, if not to reality.182 Stare decisis is twice diminished. 
First, the decision itself is freed from the responsibility to reason within full 
view. Second, an increment of precedent is rendered unusable. Nonpublication 
could allow arbitrary and unreasonable decisions to go unnoticed and unre-
medied, substituting a rule of men for a rule of law. First impressions might 
go unchecked. Judging in such cases might degenerate into an administrative-
style case processing. One of the major means of holding article III judges 
accountable would be lost. The parade of possible horrors marches on and on. 
Little of substance can be said of the actual experience of the courts of 
appeals with the nonpublication rules. Critics and champions alike have fought 
with speculations. The commentary has largely been negative, much of it in-
tensely SO.183 Professors Reynolds and Richman have attempted an empirical 
!d. 
180. See Merrill, supra note 142, at 471. 
We must not make the loads these captives bear an unbearable one or the system 
surely will collapse. It is on the critical appraisal of the scholar that the public must largely 
rely for an impersonal and knowledgeable assessment of the work of the courts. It is upon 
the discriminating briefing of the lawyers that we ourselves depend. We should strive to 
relieve these people from waste of time in reading that which really adds nothing to the 
substance of the law. 
181. See gmerally Jacobstein, Some Reflections on the Control of the Publication of Appellate Coutt 
Opinions, 27 STAN. L. REV. 791, 795·96 (1975). 
The resourcefulness of the specialized bar is not only equal to the task of coping with the opinion 
output but seems capable of circumventing the courts' reduction efforts. For example, the May 
1982 issue of the Banking Law Journal carried an editorial requesting the readership to send in 
unreported opinions for unofficial publication in its pages. Dunne, Editor's Headnotes, 99 BANKING 
L.J. 387 (1982). 
182. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 166, at 581. 
183. See, e.g., Gardner, Ninth Circuit's Unpublished Opinions: Denial of Equal Justice?,61 A.B.A. 
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assessment of the various non publication plans in the courts of appeals. 184 Ex-
pected benefits include swifter justice and increased productivity. The study 
found that appeals decided with unpublished opinions were resolved much more 
quickly, although Professors Reynolds and Richman found it impossible to de-
termine how much of the time saved was attributable to the non publication 
designation and how much was the simple result of less judicial effort required 
for decision. 185 While their study found no support for the hypothesis that limited 
publication enhances productivity, the researchers were careful to explain that 
any conclusion on productivity was impossible because of the number of var-
iables. 186 
The study sought to measure two costs of nonpublication: diminished opin-
ion quality and suppression of precedent. The study divided all of opinion 
writing into three parts: reasoned opinions, decisions based on the opinion 
below, and decisions without discernible justification. 187 At minimum the prin-
cipal investigators preferred an opinion that identified the appeal and went on 
to give reasons for and to declare the ultimate result. Although most of the 
unpublished opinions did this, the authors were somewhat critical of the decision 
by reference to a trial court opinion. The decision-by-reference was criticized 
due to the lack of access by those not parties to the litigation and the appearance 
that the decision on appeal was merely a rubber stamp.188 These criticisms are 
not persuasive. Unpublished opinions are not designed to serve a constituency 
beyond the actual litigants, and a "reasoned opinion" that parrots the opinion 
below does little to dissuade the extreme cynic. The third category, decisions 
with no discernible justifications, marks only a difference in opinion typology 
between this author and Professors Reynolds and Richman. They criticized the 
non publication plans for including the previously discussed option to decide an 
appeal without an opinion. 189 Certainly, the ad hoc use of the boilerplate opinion 
that recites simply "after due consideration" or "upon a review of the record 
and the briefs of the parties" is no better than the formal provisions that allow 
for a one word judgment "affirmed."190 Those are not unpublished opinions, 
however, not because they are not published, but because they are not opinions. 
The second cost Professors Reynolds and Richman addressed was the opinion 
that should have been published but was not; that is, the problem of suppressed 
precedent. 191 Although they did not discover widespread suppression of prece-
J. 1224 (1975); Hoffman, Nonpublication of Federal Appellate Court Opinions, 6 JUST. Sys. J. 405 (1981); 
Stern, The Enigma of Unpublished Opinions, 64 A.B.A. J. 1245 (1978); Comment, A Snafce in the Path 
of the Law: The Seventh Circuit's Non-Publication Rule, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 309 (1977). 
184. See generally Reynolds & Richman, supra note 166; Reynolds & Richman, supra note 158; 
Reynolds & Richman, Limited Publication in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, 1979 DUKE L.J. 807. 
185. See Reynolds & Richman, supra note 166, at 593-95. 
186. See id. at 595-97. 
187. See id. at 599-604. 
188. See id. 
189. See supra text accompanying notes 139-64. 
190. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 166, at 603-04. 
191. See id. at 606-21. 
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dent, the authors found opmlOns that they were persuaded should have been 
published. Examples of such holdings included novel state law questions, de-
fective administration by an agency, inadequacies of national statutes, and dis-
trict court mistakes. '92 Additionally, they suggested that nonpublication was 
inappropriate, although actually rare, when judges articulate concurring or dis-
senting opinions or when the judgment was reversed. '93 
On balance, Professors Reynolds and Richman concluded that the suppressed 
precedent is a less significant problem than the "shoddy" opinion. '94 Their 
ultimate conclusion that any proposed rule must maximize the "benefits of 
limited publication while avoiding as many costs as possible"195 is the correct 
one. Their intermediate reasoning, however, is not fully persuasive. Although 
a satisfactory method for selecting which opinions to publish may not exist, the 
present patchwork system is unsatisfactory.196 Standards are necessary. Both the 
Advisory Council on Appellate Justicel97 and the American Bar Association 
192. Id. at 606-12. 
193. See id. at 612-20. 
194. See id. at 621. The authors also considered the disparate impact of nonpublication in 
certain categories of cases, the relationship between the nonargument calendar and nonpublication, 
and the role of the central staff, which taken together suggested that "the courts of appeals often 
behave much like courts with discretionary jurisdiction - like certiorari courts - in short." /d. 
at 625. 
195. Id. at 626. 
196. "[TJhere is no satisfactory method of selecting which cases are to be published and ~hich 
omitted." Jacobstein, supra note 181, at 794. See gmerally Walther, supra note 170. 
197. At the behest of the Federal Judicial Center, a group of lawyers, law teachers, and judges 
joined with the National Center for State Courts to form the Council, which promulgated standards 
for the publication decision: 
1. Standard for Publication 
An opinion of the (highest court) or of the (intermediate court) shall not be 
designated for publication unless: 
a. The opinion establishes a new rule or law or alters or modifies an existing 
rule; or 
b. The opinion involves a legal issue of continuing public interest; or 
c. The opinion criticizes existing law; or 
d. The opinion resolves an apparent conflict of authority. 
Opinions of the court shall be published only if the majority of the judges 
participating in the decision find that a standard for publication as set out in 
section (1) of this rule is satisfied. Concurring opinions shall be published only 
if the majority opinion is published. Dissenting opinions may be published if the 
dissenting judge. determines that a standard for publication as set out in section 
(1) of this rule is satisfied. The (highest court) may order any unpublished opinion 
of the (intermediate court) or a concurring or dissenting opinion in that court 
published. 
3. If the standard for publication as set out in section (1) of the rule is satisfied as to 
only a part of an opinion, only that part shall be published. 
4. The judges who decide the case shall consider the question of whether or not to publish 
an opinion in the cases at the conference on the case before or at the time the writing 
assignment is made, and at that time, if appropriate, they shall make a tentative decision 
not to publish. 
STANDARDS FOR PUBLICTION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS (quoted in Walther, supra note 170, at 582 n.7). 
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Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration '98 have drafted model rules. 
Since 1974 the courts of appeals have been left to their own devices. The time 
has come for rigorous evaluation and adoption of a uniform standard. '99 The 
variety of present rules provides a menu, and experience under them provides 
a data base. An optimum uniform rule would create a presumption in favor 
of publication, and require that a non publication choice be panel unanimous. 
It would also list criteria for mandatory publication. The specifics of the proposal 
should await further study. 200 
198. The A.B.A. Standard reads, in part: 
Publication of Opinions. 
(a) Public Access. Opinions of an appellate court should be a matter of public record. 
Parties should be provided copie!. of a decision and opinion when it is filed, even if general 
dissemination is withheld [sic) until the opinion is in printed form. 
(b) Formal Publication. An opinion of an appellate court should be published in the series 
of printed volumes in which the opinions of the court appear only if, in the judgment of 
the judges participating in the decision, it is one that: 
(I) Establishes a new rule of law, alters or modifies an existing rule, or applies 
an established rule to a nOvel fact situation; 
(2) Involves a legal issU(. of continuing public interest; 
(3) Criticizes existing law; or 
(4) Resolves an apparent conflict of authority. A concurring or dissenting opin-
ion should be published if its author believes it should be; if such an opinion is 
published the majority opinion should be published as well. 
ABA COMM'N ON STANDARDS OF JllDlCIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO ApPELLATE 
COURTS § 3.37 (Approved Draft 1977). 
199. Ste Note, supra note 169, at 146-48. 
200. Although their proposal is not without its flaws, Professors Reynolds and Richman have 
developed a model rule that merits further consideration. 
Rule - Opinions. 
I. Minimum Standards: 
Every decision will be accompanied by an opllllOn that sufficiently states the facts of 
the case, its procedural stance and history, and the relevant legal authority so that the 
basis for this court's disposition can be understood from the opinion and the authority 
cited. 
Publication of Opinions: 
a. Criteria for Publication: An opinion will be published if it: 
(I) establishes a new ruk of law, or alters or modifies an existing rule of law, 
or calls attention to an existing rule of law that appears to have been generally 
overlooked; 
(2) applies an established rule of law to facts significantly different from those 
in previous applications of the rule; 
(3) explains, criticizes, or reviews the history, application, or administration of 
existing decisional or enacted law; 
(4) creates or resolves a conflict of authority either within the circuit or between 
this circuit and another; 
(5) concerns or discusses a factual or legal issue of significant public interest; 
(6) is accompanied by a concurring or dissenting opinion; 
(7) reverses the decision below, unless: 
(a) the reversal is caused by an intervening change in law or fact, or 
(b) the reversal is a remand (without further comment) to the district 
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D. Case Management Plans 
As part of their response to caseload pressures, several courts of appeals 
have experimented with civil appeals management plans, acronymically known 
as CAMP.201 Although these plans differed in their particulars, they had com-
mon goals, albeit with different emphasis: 202 (1) encouraging the resolution of 
appeals without court action; (2) accelerating the consideration and disposition 
of those appeals that go to argument; (3) clarifying the issues and improving 
the quality of briefs and arguments; and (4) resolving motions and procedural 
matters informally and expeditiously. Techniques include appeal tracking forms 
that allow processing to begin before flling of the record on appeal and briefs, 
staff tailoring and monitoring of the briefing schedule, case weighting and early 
assignment to panels, and, most importantly a pre-hearing conference. 203 
The pre-hearing conference takes place before briefing. A staff attorney ad-
ministers the conference. It is attended by attorneys for both sides, who discuss 
the issues on appeal - freely and in confidence from the court.204 During that 
conference,. the staff attorney explores the possibility of a nonjudicial resolution, 
develops possible stipulations, narrows the issues, and attempts to anticipate 
and resolve a variety of procedural issues by consent, such as a stay and the 
content of the joint appendix. Although encouragement of a nonjudicial reso-
lution is an important emphasis, other features of the case management plans 
advance those appeals that do not settle. 
The feasibility and effectivenss of case management plans that use a pre-
hearing conference as a principal mechanism must be considered circuit-by-
court of a case reversed or remanded by the Supreme Court; 
(8) addresses a lower court or administrative agency decision that has been 
published; or 
(9) is an opinion in a disposition that 
(a) has been reviewed by the United States Supreme Court, or 
(b) is a remand of a case from the United States Supreme Court. 
b. Publication Decision: There shall be a presumption in favor of publication. An 
opinion shall be published unless each member of the panel deciding the case determines 
that it fails to meet the criteria for publication. 
3. The court recognizes that the decision of a case without oral argument and without 
publication is a substantial abbreviation of the traditional appellate process and will employ 
both devices in a single case only when the appeal is patently frivolous. 
Reynolds & Richman, supra note 166, at 626-28 (citations omitted). 
201. See infra text accompanying notes 252-55. See generallY Goldman, The Civil Appeals Man-
agement Plan: An Experiment in Appellate Procedural Reform, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1209 (1978); Kaufman, 
The Pre-Argwnent Conference: An Appellate Procedural Reform, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1094 (1974). 
202. Plans were implemented and evaluated in the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth 
Circuits. See L. FARMER, ApPEALS EXPEDmNG SYSTEMS: AN EVALUATION OF SECOND & EIGHTH 
CIRCUIT PROCEDURES (1981); J. GoLDMAN, THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT PREAPPEAL PROGRAM: AN EVAL-
UATION (1982); Rack, Pre-Argwnent Conferences in the Sixth Circuit Court oj Appeals, 15 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 921 (1984). CJ. FED. R. App. P. 33 (providing for a prehearing conference at the court's 
direction). 
203. See generallY J. GOLDMAN, supra note 202. 
204. See generallY A. PARTRIDGE & A. LIND, A REEVALUATION OF THE. CIVIL ApPEALS MAN-
AGEMENT PLAN (1983); Rack, supra note 202. 
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circuit. 205 Two considerations dominate the evaluation.206 First, in a court with 
a backlog of cases awaiting argument, attorney readiness need not be accel-
erated, although enhancement of presentation quality remains important. The 
prospect of long delay in those circuits may in fact increase settlement pressures, 
although no studies have been done. Second, geography becomes a problem 
for larger circuits in arranging face-to-face conferences. Distances and expenses 
have been overcome, however, by telephone conferencing in some circuitslO7 
and staff attorneys might ride circuit. 208 
Circuit-by-circuit evaluations suggest some inevitable consequences of case 
management plans. 209 Plans characterized by a pre-hearing conference reduced 
the number of motions that judges had to decide, shortened the joint appendix, 
reduced the delay between briefing and argument, and reduced the time from 
notice of appeal to termination. Although briefs were not significantly shorter, 
there was some suggestion of their improved quality. Interestingly, the impact 
on the settlement rate is unclear. In some experiences the plan had a substantial 
effect on the settlement rates, and in others no substantial differences were 
discernible. 210 The literature on the plans seems to indicate that their benefits 
outweigh their costs without considering the effect on settlement rates; but their 
real potential and ultimate justification will rest on settlement impact. That 
dimension remains uncertain and merits further experimentation and study. This 
task will be difficult, but developing a profile of the appeal with a high prob-
ability of settlement is a worthy endeavor.211 Scarce resources and extra efforts 
could then be spent more judiciously than in a plan that treated appeals as 
fungible. 
E. Staff 
As one barometer of change in the federal judicial institution, consider that 
over the decades of the 1960's and 1970's the number of support personnel 
205. Modern internal operating procedures of courts of appeals without formal plans and 
conferences do include monitoring and facilitating by central court staff. Su Johnson, Time Delays 
in the Fifth Circuit - From Docketing to Decision - Civil and Criminal Cases, 2 FIFTH CIR. REP. 345 
(1985). See also Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 214. 
206. A. PARTRIDGE & A. LIND, supra note 204, at 10·11. 
207. Rack, supra note 202, at 923 n.7. 
208. A. PARTRIDGE & A. LIND, supra note 204, at 10. 
209. See generally J. GOLDMAN, supra note 202, at 42-43 (Seventh Circuit); A. PARTRIDGE & A. 
LIND, supra note 204, at 10-11 (Second Circuit). CAMP procedures must be distinguished from 
two alternative approaches: The bygone view of treating every appeal alike and the summary 
calendar system already discussed. CAMP has both strengths and weaknesses. Volume remains a 
problem. Many cases are treated very preemptorily in a CAMP circuit under heavy docket pressure. 
A staff attorney handling the conference might not always review the record and carefully study 
the issue. Under the summary calendar approach, the judges seem to be more in control. 
210. See Rack, supra note 202, at 934 ("a substantial number of settlements"). Compare J. 
GOLDMAN, supra note 202, at 42-43 (Seventh Circuit - no difference) with A. PARTRIDGE & A. 
LIND, supra note 204, at 10-11 (Second Circuit - substantial difference). 
211. "After trying for almost a year to select cases with high settlement potential, the [Sixth 
Circuit) program staff could discern no factors reliably predictive of settlement." Rack, supra note 
202, at 926. 
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increased threefold.212 Support personnel in the offices of the clerks of court 
and in the judge's chambers represent the first line of defense against oppressive 
dockets. The actual management of an appeal involves a number of people in 
the clerk's office.213 Court reporter management schemes call for day-to-day 
management and supervision of an efficient court reporting service. The case 
manager handles all case management functions from docketing to the final 
issuance of the mandate. Staff attorneys conduct pre screening assessments of 
the appeals. Administering oral argument, fIling, word processing, handling the 
voluminous mail, and library maintenance all demand substantial personnel 
resources. Circuit executives and their staff facilitate nonjudicial responsibilities 
of the court. In chambers, law clerks and secretaries aid the judge. The court 
family is large, indeed. For purposes of this discussion, administrative personnel 
will be distinguished from decisional personnel. While commentators have largely 
ignored the former group,2H the latter group, made up of staff attorneys and 
law clerks, has received a fair amount of attention because of its direct in-
volvement in the decisionmaking process. Two related responses to the press 
of heavier caseloads have been to provide judges with more law clerks and to 
delegate judicial responsibilities to staff attorneys. During the docket crisis, both 
groups have assumed a greater prominence.215 
Much has been written about the origins and development of the law clerk 
from clerical assistant to an institution in itself.216 The federal court of appeals 
experience may be briefly described.217 Until relatively recently, each federal 
judge had only one law clerk whose role was "testing the judge's work" by 
criticizing opinion drafts and arguments, and acting as a sounding board.218 
212. Clark, Atijudication to Administration: A Statistical AnalYsis of Federal District Courts in the Twen-
tieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 144 (1981). Judicial personnel, both article III and article 
I, also have increased dramatically. See infra text accompanying notes 336-89. 
213. The position names change, but the responsibilities are the same, from circuit to circuit. 
Fifth Circuit terms will be employed here. See generallY Johnson, supra note 205, at 246-50. 
214. Su generallY Re, The Administration of Justice and the Courts, 18 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1 (1984); 
Rubin, supra note 47, at 654. More attention needs to be afforded administrative efficiencies. See 
infra text accompanying notes 239-335. 
215. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., H.R. Doc. No. 117, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 69-70 (1981) (the 
number of staff attorneys is limited to the number of judges on the court). Compare Act of June 
17, 1930, ch. 509, 46 Stat. 774 (repealed 1969) (providing a law clerk for each court of 
appeals judge) with 28 U.S.C. § 712 (1948) (providing for appointment of "necessary law clerks"). 
Two law clerks per judge were authorized in 1969 and a third in 1979. See Act of December 24, 
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-153, 83 Stat. 403; Act of September 24, 1977, Pub. L. No. 96-68, 93 Stat. 
416, 428. 
216. See generallY Baier, The Law Clerks: Profile of an Institution, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1125 (1974); 
Newland, Personal Assistants to Supreme Court Justices: The Law Clerks, 40 OR. L. REV. 299 (1961); 
Wright, Observations of an Appellate Judge: The Use of Law Clerks, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1179 (1974). 
Not all of the commentary has been compiimentary. See Kester, The Law Clerk Explosion, 9 LITIGATION 
20 (1983). 
217. For a consideration of comparable state court developments, see generally D. MEADOR, 
supra note 15, at 31-137. 
218. McCree, supra note 43, at 786-87. 
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Second and third law clerks were added as in-chambers assistants and central 
staff attorney positions were established. Today's ratio of authorized decisional 
personnel to judges is approximately four to one, a dramatic increase from the 
1969 level of about one to one. 219 An appellate judge's principal efforts take 
place in chambers: reading briefs, studying records. considering arguments, 
deciding, and writing opinions. Judging is deciding; that is the exercise of the 
article III power. 
The worry of several commentators is that the clerk's role in the reading, 
studying, considering, and writing has encroached significantly on that of the 
judge.220 Judges have responded that the opinion writing process demands some 
trade-off among functions. 221 They explain that the core function, the deciding, 
still resides with the judge, but that more and more of the opinion preparation 
function has been delegated to the law clerk. The workload, they contend, has 
forever changed the roles of clerk and judge. Judges decide the result and sketch 
a rationale. Law clerks prepare a draft opinion. Judges edit the draft. This has 
become the federal appellate paradigm.222 Appellate judges have joined the ranks 
of "senior partners, high government officials, and professors" who "scrupu-
lously review and edit" the preliminary work of their junior associates. 223 Su-
pervision and delegation, however, are in inverse proportion in this new order. m 
The workload has dramatically changed the relationship between judge and law 
clerk. 
A return to the days of one law clerk, having a negligible role, is not 
feasible. By a judge's own estimate, a judge single-handedly researching and 
writing each opinion could produce a dozen or so opinions a year, and the 
courts of appeals would be overrun. 225 The increase in number of clerks should, 
however, be ceased. Although the limits of delegation and supervision may not 
have been surpassed, they have certaintly been reached.226 Multiplying judicial 
clerkships any more would jeopardize the tradition that federal judges are re-
spectful because they do their own work. 227 
Even proponents admit that increasing the number of law clerks would result 
in diminishing marginal returns. The judge who remains a judge becomes some-
thing of a bottleneck as appeals move through the chambers only as fast as 
219. Ste Posner, supra note 37, at 767. 
220. See McCree, supra note 43, at 785·87; Vining, justice, Bureaucracy, and Legal Method, 80 
M,CH. L. REV. 248, 252-53 (1981). 
221. See Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 217·18; Posner, supra note 37, at 769; Wald, supra note 29, at 
778. 
222. Ste Posner, supra note 37, at 769; Wald, supra note 29, at 778. 
223. See Wald, supra note 29, at 778. 
224. Supervising and coordinating a tripled staff of assistants place additional demands on the 
judicial resource. Posner, supra note 37, at 767-68. 
225. See Wald, supra note 29, at 777. Even outside Judge Wald's District of Columbia Circuit 
with its complex cases, the productivity would not be too much higher. 
226. "In any event, it seems to me undesireable that we move beyond three clerks" McCree, 
supra note 43, at 787. See also Kester, supra note 216, at 62. 
227. C. WVZANSKI, WHEREAS: A JUDGE'S PREMISES 61 (1965). 
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the judge can review, evaluate, and act on recommendation and drafts. 228 Staff 
attorneys, as an alternative, work for the court as a whole rather than for an 
individual judge. There is something of a paradox here.229 Unless the staff 
attorneys are doing work that otherwise would be done by 'judges, they do not 
increase the court's productivity. Yet, if they do perform some of the judge's 
duties, the judicial function is usurped. The philosophical resolution of this 
paradox assigns to staff attorneys tasks that have been, but need not be, per-
formed by judges.23o Such a resolution, however, is not easily accomplished. 
The various courts of appeals have experimented with the job description of 
the staff attorney. Many of their results represent uncomfortable choices made 
in the face of the workload.231 One judge explains that it ;s the staff attorney 
who 
acquires a case at the moment the notice of appeal is fIled, shepherds 
it through each procedural step until the closing brief is in, prepares 
legal memoranda, drafts a proposed opinion or other disposition, rec-
ommends graJ?t or denial of oral argument, and presents the complete 
package to the judges to be graded pass/fail.232 
The key assumption here is that these tasks need not be performed by judges. 
The motions process, for example, no longer simply sends along the matter for 
judicial consideration and action. Before the motion reaches a judge, a staff 
attorney reviews it and prepares a memorandum explaining the motion and 
recommending a disposition with an attached proposed order.233 Admittedly, 
these staff attorney evaluations save a substantial amount of judge time. De-
ciding whether a case deserves oral argument and how a case should be decided, 
however, lie at the core of the judicial function. A major concern is that th"e 
widespread dependence on staff attorneys has created a bureaucratic judicial 
process.23i 
The premise of the staff attorney position is that one staff attorney does the 
work of three law clerks, one in each panel member's chambers.235 Critics of 
the expansion of central staff attorney responsibility echo the concerns expressed 
in regard to the expansion of law clerk responsibility. Both types of legal as-
sistants encroach on the judging responsibility, but the situation is worse with 
the staff attorney because the supervision present with the elbow law clerk is 
228. See Gammon, The Central Sttiff Attomrys' Office in the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth 
Circuit a Five Year Report, 29 S.D.L. REV. 457, 457 (1984). 
229. See Hellman, supra note 31, at 940-41. See general{y Gammon, supra note 228; UbeIl, Report 
on Central Sttiff Attomry's Offices in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 F.R.D. 253 (1980). 
230. See Hellman, supra note 31, at 940-41. 
231. For a circuit by circuit review, see generally Ubell, supra note 229. 
232. Hufstedler, The Appello.te Process Inside Out, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 20, 22 (1975). 
233. See Hellman, supra note 31, at 944. See also Hebman, Motions Practice in the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 12 U. TOL. L. REV. 485 (1981). 
234. See McCree, supra note 43, at 788. 
235. See Ubell, supra note 229, at 263. 
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lacking.236 Proponents, on the other hand, maintain that the harsh reality of 
caseload demand prevents judges from doing everything they once did. Staff 
attorneys perform tasks low on the judicial scale, thus allowing judges to perform 
the important appellate tasks that oblige an article III decisionmaker. Conceding 
the departure from appellate traditions, proponents assert that the wise use of 
central staff attorneys does more good than harm. 237 
The proponents of an expanded use of staff attorneys and law clerks, how-
ever, rest their arguments on an unstable foundation. With three law clerks 
and one staff attorney for each appeals judge, the judges are at the limit of 
their ability to supervise subordinate decisional personnel. 238 Thus, adding more 
law clerks or more staff attorneys is no longer an acceptable method of coping 
with the caseload. 
F. Miscellaneous Reform Proposals 
Intramural reforms take many shapes. Possible changes III how the courts 
of appeals perform their role and function are not limited to those described 
in the preceding sections. Other reforms, presently under experimentation, and 
others still on the drawing board, deserve brief mention. These proposals rep-
resent mostly tinkering with the coping mechanisms already in place. Admit-
tedly, no one can oppose better court management until costs must be paid in 
terms of money, judicial resources, and appellate ideals. 239 Both reforms achieved 
and reforms proposed invoke such familiar themes as working harder, delegating 
more authority, stream-lining procedures, and rationing resources along prior-
ities.240 
1 . Better Legislation 
The first consideration is for Congress. Judge Edwards has complained that 
the courts of appeals are choking on "ambiguous and internally inconsistent 
statutes. "241 Incoherence, vagueness, and conflicting purposes all burden judicial 
resources and decisional division. More careful drafting and a clear statement 
of purpose are required. 242 Vague legislation is not the sole product of ineptness; 
characteristically, the legislative process is full of compromise and agreements 
achieved through escapes to higher levels of abstraction. Congress is unlikely to 
change even though the vagaries of the legislative process frequently are more 
236. See Posner, supra note 37, ~t 775; Wald, supra note 29, at 778-79. See generally Cameron, 
The Central Staff: A New Solution to a. Old Problem, 23 V.C.L.A. L. REV. 465, 479 (1976). 
237. See Gammon, supra note 228, at 446; Hellman, supra note 31, at 1003. 
238. See P. CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 48 (two law clerks and one central stafT attorney 
is the limit). 
239. J. HOWARD, supra note 31, at 274. 
240. /d. For an outline of the present national administrative structure and contemporary 
problems with some suggestions for centralized reform, see generally Meador, The Federal Judiciary 
and Its Future Administration, 65 VA. L. REV. 1031 (1979). 
241. See Edwards, supra note 3, at 424-25 (footnotes omitted). 
242. /d. at 425-26. 
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frustrating to the courts. Congress can do more, however, to remedy outmoded 
judicial statutes, answer unanticipated questions, and reconcile conflicting sta-
tutory schemes.243 Legislative responsiveness is preferable to legislative inaction 
or judicial legislating.244 
Such obligations are generally within the legitimate expectations of Congress. 
Appellate federal jurisdiction is a scarce resource that must be rationed.245 Con-
gress must be forced to rank the competing demands on the appellate resources, 
recognizing that the docket demand outstrips decisional supply and that deficits 
in jurisdiction debase the appellate remedy. Congress must articulate a hierarchy 
of appeals. Thus far it has only identified a large number of preferred categories 
of appeals without any internal consistency.246 Once this uniquely political proc-
ess equalizes supply and demand and assigns supply priorities, Congress must 
not practice deficit jurisdiction. For the solution to be long lasting, Congress 
must monitor and maintain the equilibrium. Just as important, Congress must 
consider jurisdictional impact statements and expressly reorder the hierarchy 
with each new statute that has an impact on the federal appellate docket. This 
idea is not new. Chief Justice Burger first urged such impact statements in 
1970.241 Such an approach is needed today more than ever.248 
2. Technology 
The appellate judiciary must do its part in- the administrative realm. Few 
proposals go beyond the reforms in place; administrative reforms have been all 
but exhausted. A few recently proposed innovations, however, merit brief men-
tion. Sometimes taken for granted and too often overlooked, technology and 
its application should be of strong interest to those concerned with appellate 
court reform. State of the art hardware is a minimum requirement. That means 
at the least, word processing equipment and related electronic document transfer 
capability.249 Several courts of appeals are presently experimenting with direct 
electronic transmission of opinions between chambers and to the publisher. 250 
But the need goes beyond hardware. Further research and development is re-
quired in the area of computer-based case and court management information 
243. Id. at 427. 
244. Id. at 427-29. 
245. Hill & Baker, supra note 68, at 85. 
246. Id. at 82-85 n.333. See generally The Impact of Civil Expediting Provisions on the United States 
Courts of Appeals, 37 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 19 (1982) (a discussion of appellate priority and proposals 
for refonn). 
247. See Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary - 1972, 58 A.B.A. J. 1049, 1050 (1972). 
248. See Meyer, Justice, Bureaucracy, Structure, and Simplification, 42 MD. L. REV. 659, 671-72 
(1983); Rubin, supra note 47, at 658. 
249. See Wallace, OUT Judicial System Needs Help: A &w Inside Thoughts, 12 U.S.F. L. REV. 3, 
13-14 (1977). Today Judge Wallace's plea for help has been answered. Word processing equipment 
is in place in all the courts of appeals. Still the need for updating and improving remains. 
250. Frank, The Rush Is On, 71 A.B.A. J. 32 (1985). See generally J. GREENWOOD & L. FARMER, 
THE IMPACT OF WORD PROCESSINC AND ELECTRONIC MAIL ON UNITED STATES. COURTS OF ApPEALS 
(1979) (a look at test results showing judges' ability to save time through use of electronic equipment). 
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systems. 251 Possible applications of technology include video conferences and 
even video arguments with judges and attorneys simultaneously appearing before 
camera. Such innovations should be encouraged and subsidized. 
3. Administrative Units 
Congress has recognized the peculiar administrative problems of the so-called 
super-circuits, the large courts of appeals. In 1978, section 6 of the Omnibus 
Judgeship Act authorized courts of appeals with more than fifteen active judges 
to reorganize themselves internally into administrative units and to reorder its 
en banc procedures by court rule.252 Only the former Fifth Circuit253 (before 
creation of the new Fifth and Eleventh Circuits) and the Ninth Circuit, m how-
ever, qualified and implemented administrative unit plans. These plans served 
to decentralize the clerks' offices but accomplished little else. In any event, the 
provision is of limited applicability because only the new Fifth, the Sixth, and 
the Ninth Circuits have the qualifying number of judges. 255 
4. Differentiated Case Management 
The principle of differentiated case management has been the most common 
response to the docket growth of the last twenty-five years. Most significant for 
the appellate ideal has been a trend away from managing and processing each 
case uniformly, and toward adoption of differentiated case management. 1S6 While 
at first an unconscious byproduct of coping with docket growth, this trend has 
become the guiding principle of the federal appellate process. The larger circuits 
have led the way. A hallmark of this case management approach is monitoring 
each stage of an appeal: notice of appeal, briefing, submission, and decision. 
The large circuits have relied on case screening to assign cases to the argument 
or nonargument calendar. Such plans are extolled and their extension recom-
mended.257 
251. Nikon & Wheeler, Using Technology to Improve the Administration of Justice in the Fedaal Courts, 
1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 659. 
252. See Act of October 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633 (codified at 
28 U.S.C. § 41 (Supp. II 1978)). 
253. Baker, A Prima on Precedmt in the Eleventh Circuit, 34 MERCER L. REV. 1175, 1178-79 
(1983). 
254. Deane & Tehan, Judicial Administration in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, II GOLDEN GATE L. REV. I, 8-9 (1981). 
255. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal judgeships Act of 1984, Pub. L. 1'\0. 98·353, 
98 Stat. 333 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 44 (Supp. 1985)). The Ninth Circuit has experImented with 
a limited en bane paneL See Deane & Tehan, supra note 254, at 14-15. See also JUDICIAL COUNCIL 
OF THE NINTH CIR., SECOND BIENNI"L REPORT TO CONGRESS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 6 OF 
THE OMNIBUS JUDGESHIP ACT OF 1978 AND OTHER MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE WITHIN THE NINTH CIRCUIT Ouly 1984). 
256. Whittaker, Differentiated Case Management in Uruted States Courts of Appeals, 63 F R.D. 457, 
458 (1974). 
257. See supra text accompanying notes 113-28. See generally Rubin & Ganucheau, Appellate Delay 
and Cost - An Ancient and Common Disease: Is It Intractable?, 42 MD. L. REV. 752 (1983). 
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Another proposal worthy of serious consideration within a case management 
scheme is a sua sponte dismissal process for lack of jurisdiction. Private and 
judicial resources may be wasted by the failure to consider jurisdiction at the 
threshold.258 At times litigants and judges lose sight of the federal judicial role 
as limited courts of a limited sovereign.259 An appeal brought outside the court 
of appeals' jurisdiction is beyond its power to decide, and the court is obliged 
to dismiss, even sua sponte.260 Although no system can identify every jurisdic-
tional defect, some courts have experimented successfully with formal jurisdiction 
screening.261 Screening might be accomplished as early as the notice of appeal 
stage or in the principal brief.262 Such a system could save appreciable appellate 
resources with a minimal investment. 
5. Inventorying Cases 
Proposals to screen cases for argument or nonargument calendars show signs 
of developing into a broader approach of differentiating appeals, sometimes 
called "inventorying." More complete control over case flow requires more 
complete monitoring as well as early classification. Inventorying provides more 
useful information at each stage of the appellate process. 
Consider briefly the Ninth Circuit's system.263 A staff attorney obtains a 
full set of briefs and checks first for jurisdiction. Next, an inventory card is 
prepared with essential information, and the issues on appeal are identified and 
classified. Along with a brief summary, the staff attorney suggests a weight; 
that is, an estimate of the relative amount of judicial time required for reso-
lution. The weight is the used to equalize panel workloads. 
Issue classification encourages the assignment of similar appeals to a single 
panel to avoid duplication and inconsistent resolution. Such clustering gives the 
judges a broader perspective on the issues and contributes to a more compre-
hensive series of decisions. Recurring issues are identified in several manifes-
tations to allow for greater guidance to the trial courts and the bar. Inventorying 
assesses subject matter and difficulty to provide a basis for differentiation.264 
Similar cases can be dealt with together. Difficult cases may be culled for 
complete review. A well-developed coding system even permits computeriza-
tion.265 Computerization allows a judge or law clerk to ascertain essential in-
formation from a glance at a printout. Co~puter sorting and retrieval facilitates 
case differentiation for appropriate procedures and identifies trial and appellate 
258. Su, e.g., Gillette Co. v. Miner, 459 U.S. 86 (1982). 
259. Hill & Baker, supra note 68, at 6-7. 
260. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1981). 
261. Meyer, supra note 248, at 693. 
262. The Fifth Circuit requires that "[e]ach principal brief shall include a concise statement 
of the statutory or other basis of the jurisdiction of this Court, containing citations of authority 
when necessary." 5TH CIR. R. 28.2.5. 
263. See general[y Hellman, supra note 31, at 957-64. 
264. Meador, supra note 74, at 259-81. 
265. Deane & Tehan, supra note 254, at 10. 
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court patterns. 266 For example, cases npe for pre argument conference and set-
tlement might be identified. 267 
Another system of inventorying is the District of Columbia's approach to 
the identified "big cases. "21>8 A "big case" typically involves an important 
administrative issue or a large and complicated record. Preargument conferences 
are used to clarify issues and consolidate the record. Oral arguments are ar-
ranged by subject area rather than by party. Post-argument memoranda and 
conferences might aid opinion preparation on highly technical questions. Thus, 
inventorying identifies the cases calling for peculiar procedural adjustments. 
6. Fast Track Appeals 
Inventorying may also be used to identify appeals appropriate for a "fast 
track" process and for monitoring their disposition. Expedited appeals are noth-
ing new. 269 A consistent goal has been to reduce the docket by reducing the 
time in the briefing, argument, and decision sequence. Some courts have ex-
perimented with an interesting variation. When the parties voluntarily elect the 
fast track after briefing, the court advances the case on its docket. The court 
may then allow oral argument, and announce a decision without opinion. l70 
Speed is the obvious advantage of this procedure. The attorneys are allowed 
full participation. Just as obvious, the chief disadvantage is the lost opinion, 
a real concern under the appellate ideal.271 But notice that here the parties, 
rather than the court, make the choice. Admittedly, this election undercuts some 
of the earlier criticisms. 
7. Greater Orality 
One recent proposal reevaluates the deemphasis of oral argument in federal 
appeals. Professor Meador has called for greater orality.272 In his proposal·, 
written filings would be kept to a minimum and oral argument would have no 
time limit. The success of this approach would depend upon counsels' pres-
266. Hellman, supra note 31, at 961. 
267. See supra text accompanying notes 201-11. The benefits of inventorying should not be 
overstated. "Evening up" the workload of each judge or each panel does not add anything ap-
preciable to the quality of judging. Furthermore, inventorying is symptomatic; the more current 
the docket the fewer the opportunities for grouping similar appeals. Ultimately, the issue is whether 
the benefit outweighs the cost. 
268. Loventhal, Appellate Procedures: Design, Patchwork, and Managed Flexibility, 23 C.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 432, 444-47 (1976). 
269. See supra text accompanymg notes 113-200. 
270. Set D.C. CIR. R. 13(c); Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 221. 
271. See supra text accompanymg notes 137-200. See generally Perry, The Fast Track· Accelerated 
Disposition of Civil Appeals in the Oklahoma Supreme Court, 6 OKLA. CITY L. REV. 453 (1981) (an 
overview and discussion of the advantages and disadvantagt's of Oklahoma's fast track); Lay, Re· 
conciling Tradition with Reality: The Expedited Appeal, 23 V.C.L.A. L. REV. 419 (1976) (suggestions 
on how to decrease the time from notice of appeal to final disposition). 
272. See Meador, Toward Orality and Visibility in the Appellate Process, 42 MD. L. REV. 732 (1983). 
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entation of argument and authority, the judges' questions, and the judges' 
ability to confer with each other- during and after argument.273 Similar to the 
- English tradition, this approach would combine oral argument and court con-
ference in one proceeding. Inventorying would be necessary, either to identify 
whole categories of cases or to screen cases for assignment to the oral track. 
Several experiments suggest the soundness of Professor Meador's proposal.2H 
It could not become the exclusive model, however. Orality proves inefficient 
in many situations: (1) when the case is complex; (2) when the issues are 
numerous and sophisticated; (3) when the trial transcript is delayed; (4) when 
the backlog would delay argument long after trial; (5) when the court is not 
convenient to the bar; and (6) when the judges are resistent. Greater orality 
sounds good, and it lends itself to routine cases that involve common legal 
principles. Difficult issues, however, require substantial advance work by judges. 
Written briefs promote efficient resolution of these issues. Furthermore, the 
variety of legal issues confronting the courts of appeals makes it difficult to 
attain the mastery required by complete orality. Nevertheless, orality could 
provide an efficient option within an inventory system for the truly commonplace 
appeals. 
8. Maintaining Judicial Productivity 
Proposals for reform within the existing appellate structure are not limited 
to non-decisional, administrative matters. Many judges and commentators have 
suggested ways to improve the judging art. These suggestions have peculiar 
application to the courts of appeals. In short, they ask that judges do more 
and do better. 
If the appellate ideal is to be realized, judges must have time for study, 
deliberation and collegiality. Oral argument panel participations require prep-
aration. The courts of appeals now appear at their limit of effective operation, 
averaging one week of oral arguments per month.275 Of course, memorandum 
opinions would increase productivity by allowing more nonargument calendar 
cases to be decided.276 
Deadlines would also force judges to do more. 277 The Supreme Court follows 
a term-end deadline for all decisions in cases argued each term. Lawyers must 
live with briefing deadlines. Similar restrictions would be appropriate for ap-
pellate judges. The District of Columbia Circuit, for example, has imposed 
internal procedures that (1) bar judges from hearing cases -in a new term if 
they have not circulated draft opinions in more than three cases argued at least 
273. !d. at 749. 
274. Besides the English and early American experience, simulations in Arizona, Colorado, 
and California have been well-received. !d. at 738-47. 
275. Carrington, supra note 24, at 558; Wright, supra note 74, at 962. 
276. See supra text accompanying notes 137-200. 
277. Wald, The Problem with Courts, 20 TRIAL 28, 33 (1984) ("One thing courts need is dead-
lines. "). 
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six months previously, and (2) require judges to respond to a circulated draft 
within seven days, and authorize the writing judge to release the opinion after 
thirty days pass without dissent. 278 Such measures merit study and, perhaps, 
more widespread application. 
9. Two-J udge Panels 
Another possible way to increase productivity without creating additional 
judgeships involves rethinking the three-judge panel. 279 A three-judge panel has 
been the federal tradition and the American norm for an intermediate court 
sitting in panels. 280 On occasion, however, one member has been unable to 
continue and a quorum of two has decided the appeal usually with no untoward 
result. 281 This exception could be made the rule. In the run of federal appeals, 
two judges would be sufficient, if they agreed, and a third could be brought 
in only when the two could not agree. 282 In fact, the routine nonargument case 
generally proceeds in this manner, as an initiating judge drafts a proposed 
opinion and solicits a second vote. 
This proposal, however, contains some distinct disadvantages.283 One fewer 
perspective might reduce the quality of decision. It might also increase the 
influence of law clerks and staff attorneys as decisionmaking becomes more in-
chambers than between chambers. The entire decisionmaking process would be 
changed, perhaps in unknown ways, by moving from a triad to a dyad. The 
dyad necessarily would be less representative of the whole court. The frequency 
of division is not predictable. Arrayed against these concerns is the savings of 
one-third of the judgepower now expended. Inventorying also might select proper 
cases for this truncated panel. 
10. Improving Judicial Decisionmaking 
Several related and modest proposals suggest ways the courts of appeals 
could perform better. These proposals are not meant to degrade the quality of 
the courts' work. 284 However, the federal legal system can be made more "in-
telligible. "285 No one could oppose this reform. The trick is how to accomplish 
278. Wald, supra note 29, at 785. See also Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 215. 
279. Utilizing senior judges, visiting judges, and district judges as a third panel member also 
would avoid the creation of additional court of appeals judgeships. Ste infra text accompanying notes 
336-89. Almost all that can be done in this regard, however, has already been done. Su groerally 
Carrington, supra note 24, at 563-66. 
280. Su 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1932); A.B.A. COMM'N ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., STAND-
ARDS RELATING TO COURT ORGANIZATION, Standard 1.13(b)(iv) (1974). 
281. Su 28 U.S.C. § 46(d) (1982). 
282. Meador, supra note 74, at 281-82. See groerally AMERICAN B. FOUND., ACCOMMODATING THE 
WORKLOAD OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF ApPEALS (1968). 
283. See groerally Carrington, supra note 24, at 561-63. 
284. "[N]o one will understand me to be speaking with disrespect. .. [for] one may CritiCize 
even what one reveres." Holmes, The Path oj the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 473 (1897). 
285. Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 19. 
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it. As a beginning point, judges must recognize that they administer the law 
in partnership with the bar. Indeed, on a day-to-day basis the principal ad-
ministrators of the law are the lawyers at work in their offices. 286 
This idea of partnership between bench and bar has a significant ramification 
for the attorney. First, the bar must shoulder some of the blame for what has 
been called the "Let's Everybody Litigate" mentality.287 That attitude contrib-
utes to clogged dockets.288 Second, once on appeal, attorneys can no longer 
brief and argue cases as though the traditional process has remained intact.289 
Modern appellate procedures barely resemble those of a less litigious era. Re-
ducing expectations and demands through limits on briefmg and arguing would 
be beneficial. Indeed, the resourcHul advocate takes advantage of the modern-
ized procedure. Clearer, shorter, more definitive opinions make the work of 
both judges and lawyers more effective. 
Judges must do their part to make the law more understandable, more 
predictable and hence, more administrable.29O This goal has an important by-
product. The more certain the law, the more predictable the outcome, and 
appeal is less likely. This is important because the most effective way to reduce 
the appellate workload is to reduce the number of appeals fIled. 291 Part of this 
certainty arises from principled decisionmaking. Cases must be decided on the 
basis of general, articulated principles of common application. 
In the majority of decisions, courts can simply identify and apply the prin-
ciple in the common law tradition. But the role of the judge is not so limited, 
as Judge Edwards, Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia Circuit, has 
explained.292 He has described the importance of the judge's role in a few 
contexts of what he calls "wide-angled adjudication. "293 When an appeal pre-
sents a specific type of recurring problem, disposes of an enormously important 
problem, or presents an opportunity for clarification of existing law with the 
anticipation of future litigation, then Judge Edwards argues for a broader de-
cisional sense.294 Wide-angled decisionmaking requires a broader analysis and 
prediction to better guide attorneys and future courts. On such occasions, the 
court must provide a clear, precise, and fully-reasoned decision.295 At first this 
position seems at odds with the earlier exhortation to brevity and clarity. But 
in the long run, the law is better served by selective and discriminating use 
of wide-angled adjudication. The key is discrimination in the use of the ap-
proach. 
286. Id. 
287. Rosenberg, Let's Everybody Litigate?, 5 TEX. L. REV. 1349 (1972). 
288. Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 19. 
289. Meador, supra note 74, at 293. 
290. Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 19-20. 
291. Rubin, Views from the Lower Court, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 448, 451 (1976). 
292. See Edwards, supra note 3, at 413. 
293. !d. 
294. See id. at 413-14. 
295. Id. at 419. 
HeinOnline -- 37 U. Fla. L. Rev.  270 1985
270 UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LA W REVIEW [Vol. XXXVII 
Such discrimination leads to a sensItive subject, without mention of which 
no federal jurisdiction article would be complete: judicial restraint. Judicial 
restraint in the present context means the court of appeals should abide by the 
appellate ideal vis-a-vis the district court. As explained before, the federal court 
system must remain integrated, with decisionmaking power concentrated at the 
lowest level. 296 Statutes, precedents, and rules of court define the appellate role 
to consider only those questions within its scope of authority. 297 The courts of 
appeals must discontinue the trend of drawing power to themselves and away 
from the trial courts. 298 
11. Advisors 
While the foregoing proposals are largely aspirational and noncontroversial, 
one more concrete suggestion for reform has recently resurfaced amidst mild 
disagreement. The idea is to provide judges access to expert advisors. The idea 
is not new; thirty years ago Judge Wyzanski appointed an economist as his 
law clerk during a complex antitrust trial. 299 In its preliminary report, the 
Hruska Commission30o suggested that a pool of scientific advisors be created to 
function analogously to law clerks in appeals calling for high level sophistication 
in science and technology.30I The preliminary suggestion was withdrawn, due 
to critical reaction primarily concerned with the possibility that information and 
arguments might reach the decisionmaker without knowledge of the parties and 
without being tested by the adversary process.302 More recently, an Eighth Circuit 
panel hired a university professor as a contract consultant to prepare reports 
and memoranda to assist the court in understanding the record in a difficult 
Investment Companies Act case. '103 The panel allowed the parties to respond 
to the consultant's reports and the parties bore no expenses from the experi-
ment. 104 Because the reports incorporated materials dehors the record, the Su-
preme Court criticized the practice. 'lOS 
296. Hill & Baker, supra note 68, at 81. 
297. Carrington, supra note 24, at 562. 
298. !d. See generally Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751 
(1957). But see Goldbold, Fact Finding by Appellate Courts - An Available and Appropriate Power, 12 
CUM. L. REV. 365 (1982) (appellate fact finding is proper and does not injure the judicial system). 
299. See Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 
509, 552-53 (1974). 
300. See supra text accompanying notes 93-100. 
301. COMM'N ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT ApPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND IN-
TERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, A PRELIMINARY REPORT 83 (1975) (quoted 
in Hellman, supra note 31, at 983). 
302. The sequence of events is (hronicled in T. MARVELL, supra note 15, at 353 n.17, Hellman, 
supra note 31, at 981-82. 
303. Collins v. SEC, 532 F.2d 584, 605 n.40 (8th Cir. 1976). 
304. !d. 
305. "We are not cited to any statute, rule, or decision authorizing the procedure employed 
by the Court of Appeals." E.!. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 57 (1977) 
(citations omitted). But cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (the Supreme Court, using a similar 
approach, did not allow response to additional material); Meyer, supra note 248, 679·80. 
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The appellate ideal seemingly will not countenance anyone but the judges 
roaming beyond the record. Brandeis briefs, solicited supplemental briefs, and 
amicus curiae appearances, however, are all part of the appellate tradition and 
serve the same purpose. Perhaps, the Court has implied that these are sufficient, 
and properly so. Generally, expert witnesses, like all witnesses, should be limited 
to the trial courtroom.306 Court-appointed experts at trial are subject to careful 
restrictions providing for notice and adversary evaluation.307 If an appellate judge 
cannot comprehend a factual record so carefully constructed, the solution may 
be to assign the controversy outside the adversary process altogether. Addi-
tionally, no justification exists for referring legal questions. Judges are the ex-
perts on the law. In sum, article III decisionmaking requires an article III 
decisionmaker.308 
12. Frivolous Appeals 
One last proposal for intramural reform merits special emphasis. It may 
represent the most significant reform in the category, yet has gone virtually 
unused until recently. While their jurisdiction is for Congress alone to change, 
the courts of appeals show signs of ending the tradition of unimpeded appellate 
access by imposing sanctions in frivolous appeals.309 
The prevailing perception of the docket crisis is that a large number of 
appeals are frivolous or hopeless, and simply drain judicial resources for naught.3JO 
In criminal cases, both paying and indigent defendants have profound incentives 
to appeal, and indigent appellants have no costs or disincentives at all.3JJ Sanc-
tions for frivolous appeals are therefore best considered in civil cases. Courts 
impose sanctions for compensation and deterrence: compensation to the op-
posing party for the time and expense of the appeal; deterrence to those who 
would take the wasteful appeal, thereby delaying consideration of valid ap-
peals.312 
Identifying the truly frivolous appeal is essential yet somewhat metaphysi-
cal.3J3 The determination necessarily involves some measure of the appellate 
306. FED. R. EVID. 702, 703. 
307. Id. 706 (provides for a specific charge, notice to the parties, discovery, party access and 
cross·examination, and guarantees the parties their own experts). 
308. As obvious as this might seem, some commentators take seriously the suggestion that 
difficult legal issues be referred to outstanding law professors for study and recommendations. See 
Nelson, supra note 51, at 46. But see Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 208. 
309. The recent trend has not escaped the notice of commentators. See, e.g., Cochran, Trouhk 
on the HoriZlJn: The Caesloat! Problem and the "Frivolous Appeal", 2 FIFTH CIR. REP. 249 (1985); 
Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 221-22; Martineau, supra note 45; Oberman, supra note 74; Note, Disincentives 
to Frivolous Appeals: An EvaluaJion oj an ABA Task Force Proposal, 64 VA. L. REV. 605 (1978). 
310. Davies, Creshilm's Law Revisited: Expedited Processing Techniques aat! the Allocation of Appellate 
Resources, 6 JUST. Sys. J. 372, 374 (1981). 
311. Id. at 374. Professor Davies found that criminal appeals consistently lose to civil appeals 
in the competition for appellate court resources. lti. at 373. 
312. Martineau, supra note 45, at 847-48. See also Oberman, supra note 74, at 844. 
313. "Frivolity, like obscenity, is often difficult to define." WSM, Inc. v. Tennessee Sales 
Co., 709 F.2d 1084, 1088 (6th Cir. 1983). 
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court's perspective, expectations and receptiVIty to the issue raised. 314 Various 
factors of hopelessness, jurisdictional and substantive, inform the determina-
tion. 315 Appellate conduct which is dilatory or misleading to an adversary or 
to the court should also play a prominent role. 316 Some courts have vacillated 
between subjective and objective standards of frivolity, between an actual bad 
faith motivation and a reasonably prudent attorney standard. 3J7 Other courts 
have framed the choice between a negligence standard and an intent standard. 118 
Still other courts have been pn:occupied only with how the appeal is conducted.319 
Although the courts have been less than straightforward, the key to under-
standing the various frivolity standards is determining whether the merit of the 
appeal or the motive of the appellant should control. 320 Whatever the standard, 
sanctions may be imposed for frivolous appeals under statute,321 rule,322 and the 
courts' inherent power.:l23 
Monetary sanctions include double costs,324 damages, attorneys fees, and 
fines. 325 The court may assess these sanctions against the attorney or the ap-
pellant. Historically, courts have been reluctant to impose such sanctions. Whether 
the recent renaissance of monetary sanctions is more than episodic, and whether 
it will serve as an effective deterrent, is not yet known.326 At the very least, 
314. Davies, supra note 310, at 375-76. 
315. Martineau, supra note 45, at 850-51. 
316. /d. 
317. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d 637,649-50,646 P.2d 179, 186-87, 183 
Cal. Rptr. 508, 515-16 (1982) (where a California court discusses the standards applied when 
determining whether an appeal is frivolous) (commented on in Forucci, Roland & Stalcup, CalifornIa 
Supreme Court Survry: A Review of Dtcisions: January 1982 - June 1982, 10 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 167, 
174 (1982). 
318. See Comment, Awards of Attornrys' Fees Against Attornrys- Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 
60 B.U.L. REV. 950, 962-68 (1980). 
319. See Martineau, supra note 45, at 856. 
320. /d. at 857. See generally Oberman, supra note 74. 
321. 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1982) (courts of appeals have discretion to award the prevailing party 
"just damages for his delay, and single or double costs"). Set Martineau, supra note 45, at 857-
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982) (provides, in part, that an attorney "who so multiplies the proceedings 
in any case unreasonably and vexatiously" may be ordered "to satisfy personally the excess costs, 
expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct"). Stt also Prossnitz, 
Fines Against the Tn'al Lawyer, LITIGATION, Fall 1983, at 36. 
322. FED. R. App. P. 38 (authorizes an award of just damages and single or double costs to 
the appellee in frivolous appeals). 
323. See, t.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980). Some courts of 
appeals have a local rule on the subject passed under the general authorization of FED. R. App. 
P. 47. See 5TH CIR. R. 42; 11TH CIR. R. 18. Additionally, FED. R. App. P. 46 contemplates 
sanctions in the courts of appeals' disciplinary authority over attorneys. 
324. Single costs or interest payment are authorized in any appeal under FED. R. App. P. 
37, 39. 
325. See generally Martineau, supm note 45, at 865-69. 
326. See, e.g., Tatum v. Regents of Nebraska-Lincoln, 103 S. Ct. 3084 (1983) (the Supreme 
Court may have delivered an important signal to the courts of appeals when a five-] ustice majority 
entered a one-sentence order assessing five hundred dollars in damages to a pro se petitioner under 
SUP. CT. R. 49.2); United States v. Atkinson, 748 F.2d 659, 602 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (where court 
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the present amorphous sources of authority should be consolidated and inte-
grated into a concise framework for analyzing sanction issues.327 The principal 
nonmonetary sanction, of course, is dismissal of the appeal. A truly frivolous 
appeal necessarily would be unsuccessful and, thus, dismissal is not truly a 
sanction. The result is the same as if the court heard the appeal and affirmed.328 
Dismissal, then, should be more widely used, wholly apart from monetary sanc-
tions. 
The best analogy for the dismissal of frivolous appeals in the court of appeals 
is the Supreme Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction. Not every case which 
satisfies the Court's appellate jurisdiction statute receives plenary considera-
tion.329 Instead, the appeal must initially raise a "substantial" federal question 
as that nonstatutory requirement has been developed and evolved in Court 
decisions.33o However, a proposal for change at the intermediate court need not 
be the equivalent of a certiorari jurisdiction.331 CertiorfJIi jurisdiction is a matter 
of discretion with a presumption against exercise. A suggestion for more vig-
orous dismissal of frivolous appeals would be based on overcoming a pre-
sumption of jurisdiction on the appeal as of right. Properly implemented, this 
would be more than a half-empty/half-full distinction. The key would be to 
articulate a standard for dismissal consistent with the appellate ideal. This ar-
ticulation does not seem impossible.332 The real problem is that the proposal 
resembles the disposition without opinion criticized earlier. 333 Articulating a 
standard that avoids those same dangers to the appellate ideal may be impos-
sible. However, some attempt should be made. 
G. A Postscript 
Looking back on federal appellate reforms, both accomplished and proposed, 
leaves two impressions. First, a willingness to experiment is important for tem-
porary expediency and for long term improvement. Learned Hand was not 
describing this generation of circuit judges when he stated that federal judges 
were "curiously timid about innovations. "334 Contemporary courts of appeals 
ordered party filing frivolous appeal to pay the government twice the costs the government incurred 
in defending the appeal); Reid v. United States, 715 F.2d 1148, 1155 ,7th dr. 1983) (where the 
court deemed an assessment of double costs for frivolous appeal appropriate). See generally Carrington, 
supra note 24, at 569-70; Lumbard, supra note 162, at 38. 
327. Martineau, supra note 45, at 878-85. 
328. Id. at 864. 
329. See generally Note, The Supreme Court Dismissal of Stale Court Appeals for Want of a Substantial 
Federal Question, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 749, 750 (1982). 
330. R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 4.28 (5th ed. 1978); 16 C. 
WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4014 (1977). 
331. See infra text accompanying notes 444-57. 
332. Others have tried, with mixed success. See Martineau, supra note 45, at 878-85; Oberman, 
supra note 74, at 850; Note, supra note 309, at 611-24. 
333. See supra text accompanying notes 137-200. 
334. Hand, The Contribution of an Itu!ependmt Judiciary to Civilization, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 
155, 158 (I. Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960). 
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have performed remarkably in the face of docket threat. Second, intramural 
reforms have been virtually exhausted in the effort to cope with the caseload. 
This pragmatic approach, however, has steered the federal judiciary farther and 
farther away from the deliberative, judicial model in the appellate ideal and toward 
a bureaucratic model of case processing. Further intramural reforms promise 
further slippage. In short, Professor Wright's prescient warning to be wary of 
time-saving reforms that may have unanticipated substantive consequences335 has 
gone unheeded. 
V. EXTRAMURAL REFORMS 
Significant departures from the appellate ideal and federal traditions have 
already occurred. The increase in the caseload has placed a premium on case 
management techniques. The courts of appeals have avoided a docket gridlock 
by implementing intramural reforms. New internal operating procedures, screen-
ing and inventorying, the nonargument calendar, dispositions without opinion, 
larger numbers of staff attorneys and law clerks, and administrators with in-
creased responsibilities, have all helped the judges cope. Reforms in place have 
contributed nearly all they can. Remaining intramural proposals, with few ex-
ceptions, do not promise to make much more of a difference. Yet, the docket 
siege continues. Real progress has meant that things are getting worse at a 
slower pace. 
The remaining types of reform are those termed "extramural" or "struc-
tural. " Although the distinction between intramural and extramural reforms 
may seem a bit metaphysical and subjective, the line may be defended in terms 
of separated powers. Intramural reforms are all court-created mechanisms. Ex-
tramural reforms require congressional action. In terms of the appellate ideal, 
intramural reforms merely change how the courts perform their traditional role. 
Extramural reforms consciously and directly change the role itself. While in-
tramural reforms cumulatively redefine the appellate ideal indirectly, extramural 
reforms do so individually and directly. That difference is more than an order 
of magnitude. Hence, extramural reforms should be viewed as a more serious 
threat to the federal appellate tradition. Three extramural reforms have already 
been accomplished: (1) adding judges; (2) creating specialized courts; and (3) 
circuit splitting. These reforms will be considered separately. In addition, the 
discussion will catalogue several structural reforms that are still on the drawing 
board. 
A. Adding Judges 
If demand for appellate judgepower is not decreased by, for example, re-
quiring only two judges per panel,336 one other choice is to increase supply. 
This can be done without creating new judgeships, by mining existing personnel 
335. Wright, The Federal Courts - A Century After Appomallox, 52 A.B.A. J. 742, 747 (1966). 
336. See supra text accompanying notes 279-82. 
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resources represented by senior judges, visiting judges, and district judges. Sen-
ior judges are those who have retired from regular active service but remain 
eligible to sit on a voluntary basis.337 Because they are replaced by active judges, 
their services are something of a bonus.338 Senior judges are relied on extensively 
now, however, and do not represent a likely source of additional judgepower.339 
Visiting judges from other circuits do not increase the overall judge supply but 
they have been an important means for matching supply with demand, especially 
in the larger, more threatened circuits.340 This practice serves to diffuse conges-
tion, but it is merely a short term adjustment.341 Finally, federal district court 
judges may sit on panels by special designation.342 Again, this device has been 
used mostly by the large circuits facing the most severe docket growth.343 Of 
the three, the latter represents the only long term supply of extra appellate 
judgepower. More study and planning would maximize this potential. 
A dramatic growth in federal judgeships ·has occurred at the district court 
level. During the 1960's and 1970's their ranks increased more than 100 percent 
in absolute numbers.344 Additionally, the number of support personnel increased 
substantially. Reliance on what Judge Edwards calls special "subjudges" -
masters, magistrates, and bankruptcy judges - has increased the supply of 
non-article III decisionmakers as well as their responsibilities.345 
Two points concerning these trial court developments are significant. First, 
growth at the intake court of original jurisdiction necessarily places pressure on 
the appellate function. Second, the solution of "subjudges" has been rejected 
for the courts of appeals, and properly SO.346 Permanent adjuncts are not de-
sirable in a court of error with important law making functions. Limited use 
of senior judges, visiting judges and district judges is preferred.347 But, in the 
long run, appeals ought to be decided by permanent, active circuit judges as 
much as possible.348 Decision in this manner helps ensure one law of the court 
supported by a majority of its judges. 
337. 28 U.S.C. § 294 (1982). 
338. See Carrington, supra note 24, at 563-64. 
339. But see Lumbard, supra note 162, at 33. Proposals to require retirement to increase the 
number of senior judges available for service raise no small constitutional problem. See Major, Why 
Not MandaJory Retirement for Federal Judges?, 52 A.B.A. J. 29 (1966). 
340. See Carrington, supra note 24, at 564. 
341. See id. at 564-65. 
342. 28 U.S.C. § 292-293, 295 (Supp. 1985). 
343. See Carrington, supra note 24, at 565. 
344. /d. See also Clark, supra note 212, at 71. Relatively, an 83 percent increase in federal 
trial judges per million population has occurred since the turn of the century. Id. 
345. Clark, supra note 212, at 144-45; Edwards, supra note 6, at 879-80. 
346. One noteworthy recent exception has arisen. Bankruptcy appellate panels, consisting of 
three bankruptcy judges, can hear appeals from the Bankruptcy Court before a second appeal to 
the court of appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 158 (1984 Supp.) See Deane & Tehan, supra note 254, at 16-
17. 
347. See Meador, supra note 37, at 647-48. Some critics, as we have seen, have expressed a 
concern lest staff attorneys and law clerks evolve into "subjudges." See supra text accompanying 
notes 212-38. 
348. Lumbard, supra note 162, at 33. 
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Adding judges has already changed the federal appellate structure, and con-
tinuing Congress' ad hoc approach will exacerbate the problems of growth. 
During their first decade, the courts of appeals were assigned thirty judgeships;349 
today one hundred and sixty-eight judgeships exist. 350 The congressional pal-
liative for the recent caseload growth has been adding judges. Although this 
rate eclipsed general population growth by a wide margin,351 added judgeships 
still did not keep pace with filings. 352 The single most notable legislative response 
was to add judges in fits and spurts. Between 1975 and 1982 the number of 
court of appeals judges grew from ninety-seven to one hundred thirty-two. 353 
Thirty-five judgeships were added in 1978354 and another twenty-five in 1984.355 
This resulted in some very large courts. The Ninth Circuit now has twenty-
eight authorized judgeships,356 and only the First Circuit has fewer than nine 
members/57 once thought the maximum.35B The turn of the century certainty 
of precedent, when the same three judges decided each case, has been lost due 
to the present thousands of permutations of panel membership. Conflicts are 
inevitable. Monitoring the law is nearly impossible. The traditional unifying 
function of the en banc court has become unwieldly due to size. 359 
Over the course of this growth, the internal structure of relationships of 
judge to judge, panel to panel, and panel to en banc court has become so 
complex that it cannot be said to be the same appellate system as before the 
additions. Worse still is that the additional judgeships have not achieved any 
lasting improvement. Detailed study of each large increase in the number of 
judges discloses a sharp impact on the appeals per panel ratio which lasts only 
one year.360 The major benefit of adding judges seems to be this temporary 
braking effect. 361 
The corresponding costs seem very high. As Judge Edwards has remarked, 
the government's ability to attract and retain capable judges is, at least in part, 
349. Carrington, supra note 24, at 580 n.165. 
350. 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (1984 Supp.). 
351. For example, in 1937 122,000,000 people were served by 46 court of appeals judges. By 
1980 the numbers were 266,000,000 and 132. Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 10 (citing an address 
by W. Rehnquist, Mac Swinford Lecture at the University of Kentucky (Sept. 23, 1982». 
352. For example, between 1960 and 1980 filings in the courts of appeals increased a staggering 
419 percent. Meador, supra note 37, at 618. See generally Rehnquist, supra note 6, at 6. 
353. Wald, supra note 29, at 77.5 n.26. 
354. Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1269. 
355. Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 346. 
356. !d. The Fifth Circuit had 26 judges before its division. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994. See generally Baker, supra note i 
357. Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 346. 
358. See infra text accompanying notes 374-85. 
359. See generally Baker, A Postscript on Precedent in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 36 Sw. L.J. 725, 
727-29 (1982). 
360. W. McLAUCHLAN, FEDERAL COURT CASELOADS 107 (1984). 
361. "The increase in judges only delayed what appears to be a nearly inexorable climb In 
appeals taken to the courts of appeals." !d. 
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inversely proportional to the size of the federal judiciary.362 Part of the prestige 
of the judgeships on the courts of appeals has been their relative scarcity. Until, 
this generation, the authorized number of lifetime appointments was fewer than 
the number of Senators. The concern is not that a judgeship would go begging 
but that lowered perceptions would attract lesser judges. Of course, this has 
not happened yet, but the concern is often voiced and, more often than not, 
by the judges themselves. 
Pay scale and work conditions are also part of the picture. Higher private 
sector salaries and negative perceptions of the appellate treadmill can influence 
highly qualified candidates to decline to serve.363 A more immediate concern is 
the threat to coherence and uniformity in the law.364 Ignoring the intangible 
loss of collegiality, the instability of the law grows geometrically with the addition 
of judges. Not just an evil in itself, instability also increases the workload as 
more panel rehearings and en banc courts are required, and the uncertainty 
of outcomes becomes an incentive generating more appeals.365 
362. Edwards, $Upra note 6, at 918. 
363. Compensation of judges has gained much attention. See generally Slack, Commentary -
Funding the FederalJudiciary, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (1979); Sprecher, The Threat to Judicial Irukpendence, 
51 IND. L.J. 380 (1976); Note, Compensation of the Federal Judiciary: A Reexamination, 8 U. MICH. 
J.L. REF. 595 (1975). 
On the other hand, the monetary cost of an additional properly·paid judgeship and staff represents 
an almost inconsequential sum in the national budget. See P. CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 199. 
364. See P. CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 199-200. Former Attorney General Smith recently 
expressed the concern that "(i]ncreasing the number of decisionmakers issuing opinions threatens 
uniformity, evenhandedness, and stability in the application of the law." Smith, The Role of the 
Federal COUrls, CASE & COM., Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 12 (1983). 
365. Edwards, supra note 6, at 918-19; Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 10-11. Judge Tjoflat of 
the Eleventh Circuit recently explained: 
One of the biggest problems facing the federal judiciary is the instability of the rule 
of law that results when we create great numbers of additional judgeships. The more judges 
we create at the appellate level, the larger we make courts of appeals, the more unstable 
the law becomes. If you have three judges on a court of appeals, the law is stable. It is 
stable for litigants, lawyers, and district judges. The outcome of a suit, should one be 
filed, is predictble. When you add the fourth judge to that court, you add some instability 
to the rule of law in that circuit because another point of view is added to the decision-
making. When you add the fifth judge, the sixth judge, when you get as large as the old 
Fifth Circuit was, with twenty-six judges, the law becomes extremely unstable. One of 
several thousand different panel combinations will decide the case, will interpret the law. 
Even if the court has a rule, as we did in the old Fifth, that one panel cannot overrule 
another, a court of twenty-six will still produce irreconcil;ble statements of the law. 
This tremendous potential for instability in the rule of law creates a great deal of 
litigation. So you have a situation where you add judges to dispose of more cases, and 
at the court of appeals level, at least, the new judges may well cause more litigation than 
they can terminate. 
If we are to save for tomorrow the system of justice the framers gave us, we must be 
ever mindful of this problem. 
Interview with Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat, reprinted in THIRD BRANCH, Apr., 1983, at I, 3-4. 
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The problem is not with numbers, but with priorities. Increasing the number 
of judgeships ought to be a reform of last resort. 366 The unintended effects of 
such a "quick fix" are demonstrated by the unalterable change in the basic 
structure of the courts of appeals. 367 To go on simply adding judges is itself a 
deceptively simple solution with serious consequences. The important issues 
become how to determine when an increase is necessary and whether some 
diseconomy of scale suggests a point beyond which the system cannot go without 
utterly destroying the appellate function. 
The current methodology for determining when to add new judgeships is 
surprisingly uncomplicated. The Judicial Conference surveys the judgepower 
needs of federal courts every four years and makes recommendations to Con-
gress. After that, the political process operates like a black box to create judge-
ships.:168 The addition of permanent article III positions should always be a 
matter for serious study. A multi-faceted analysis of need should be developed. 369 
A 1981 Federal Judicial Center Study considered the failings of the present 
approach and offered a reform. '170 Admitting the difficulty of assessing judgeship 
need, the study still faulted the present system. 371 First, the time lag between 
identified need and creation renders the new position less effective. Second, 
legislative litters of judges cause severe assimilation problems in terms of con-
firmation, orientation, staff, and office space.372 Third, the present system has 
increased dependence on a judgepower strategy to the exclusion of other methods 
of coping with caseloads. 
The narrow emphasis on judgeship creation has been the result of a felt 
need to have sufficient judgepower to handle case filings. 373 In terms of the 
appellate ideal, the optimum number of federal judgeships should be deter-
mined by the concept of role fashioned for federal courts. 374 Federalism de-
fines that role vis-a-vis state courts. Assessments of federal judgeship needs 
ultimately must address the present imbalance that allows what are essentially 
state claims into the federal system.375 Clearly, Congress must make this ad-
366. See Higginbotham, supra note 36, at 270. 
367. /d. at 271. 
368. The judicial needs of the country do not always play a controlling or even prominent 
role in the political process. For example, Congress allowed the needs to build until the Democrats 
recaptured the White House and then raised the appellate positions from 97 to 132 in 1978. j. 
HOWARD, supra note 31, at 270. 
369. See generally TASK FORCE 0>1 PRINCIPLES FOR ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF JUDICIAL RE-
SOURCES, ASSESSING THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL RESOURCES - GUIDELINES FOR A NEW PROCESS (Nat'l 
Center for State Courts Preliminary Draft 1983) (discussing state trial courts of general jurisdiction). 
370. C. BAAR, JUDGESHIP CREATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: OPTIONS FOR REFORM (1981), 
371. /d. at 2-4. 
372. A broader policy question is whether the executive's impact on the federal judiciary should 
be paced along presidencies. /d. at :1. 
373. Congress has "neglect[ed] important considerations of organizational dynamics and judicial 
purpose." /d. at 46. 
374. /d. at 47. 
375. This situation may be termed the "in-out" principle. Hill & Baker, supra note 68, at 
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justment.376 Moving from the long range position to the short range, the Federal 
Judicial Center Study made creative recommendations for overcoming the in-
adequacies of the present political black box: 
1. Authority to create federal court judgeships should be delegated 
to the Judicial Conference of the United States. 
2. The Judicial Conference should develop explicit and public pro-
cedures for the exercise of this new authority. 
3. Judgeship creation should be limited to no more than eight ad-
ditional positions per year. 
4. The Judicial Conference should have authority to shift judgeships 
from one district or circuit to another, by ruling that the next vacancy 
in a designated district or circuit not be filled. 
5. No additional judgeships should be created in a year in which 
overall federal case fIlings have declined, provided that judgeships can 
be shifted as proposed in item 4. 
6. Congress can veto in whole or in part the actions taken by the 
Judicial Conference under the authority conferred above, by simple res-
olution passed within ninety days of Conference submission of its rec-
ommendations to the House and Senate.377 
This reform has difficulties, but it represents a profound i~provement over the 
ad hoc process now in place.378 
A final issue on judgeship creation is whether, going beyond a fIlings per 
judge focus, an institutional limit exists on the number of appellate judges 
beyond which stability and coherence are not possible. As a matter of philos-
ophy, Justice Frankfurter recognized that federal judgeships could not be con-
81-82. See also Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 679·80 (1982) (Powell, J., dis-
senting). 
376. Hill & Baker, supra note 68, at 85-87. the difficult task remains to articulate some mean-
ingful standards of what disputes require an article III decisionmaker and reviewer. 
377. C. BARR, supra note 370, at 48. 
378. See generally Kastenmeier & Remington, Court Reform and Access to Justice: A Legislative 
Perspectiu, 16 fuRV. J. ON LEGIS. 301 (1979); Mikva, More Judgeships - But Not All at Once, 39 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 23 (1982). 
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side red a limitless resource. 379 At some point, the courts of appeals would become 
a "Tower of Babel" with too many circuits and too many judges to pursue 
effectively their appellate ideal and system function. 'j80 
The problem is to establish a specific maximum effective size of a court 
sitting in panels that can operate as a single administrative unit. 381 A committee 
of the Judicial Conference selected ~he number nine, deus ex machina, in 1964 
and announced that no court of appeals could be expected to stay efficient and 
unified if the active judgeships exceeded that number.382 As noted earlier, that 
limit has long since been overrun. 383 Nonetheless, the experts agree that a limit 
should exist. 384 
Until now, practical necessity has overcome this principle with each en-
largement of the federal appellate courts. 385 Recently, the advocacy of limits 
has enjoyed a renaissance. 386 The shared perception is that at some point large 
courts stop resembling courts under the appellate ideal and begin to function 
as administrative agencies or, worse, legislatures. Judge Posner has suggested 
a moratorium on the creation of district court judgeships.387 Because the trial 
courts are operating near capacity and the courts of appeals are roughly keeping 
pace, his solution would suspend appellate docket growth.388 The consequent 
queuing at the trial level might force the type of system overhaul federal ju-
risdiction sorely needs. 389 
379. The consequences that [the expanding federal caseioadJ entails for the whole federal judicial 
system ... cannot be met by a iteady increase in the number of federal judges .... The 
function and role of the federal courts and the nature of their judicial process involve 
impalpable factors, subtle but far reaching, which cannot be satisfied by enlarging the 
judicial plant .... In the farthesr. reaches of the problem a steady increase in judges does 
not alleviate; in my judgment, it is bound to depreciate the quality of the federal judiciary 
and thereby adversely to affect the whole system. 
Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 58-59 (1954) (Frankfurter, j., concurring). 
See also H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 44-46 (1973); Bork, Dtaling with 
the Overload in Articlt III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231, 234 (1976). 
380. See Meador, supra note 37. at 642. 
381. Carrington, supra note 24, at 584 n.189. See also supra text accompanying notes 249-51. 
382. 1964 ANNUAL REPORT JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 15. The Committee 
provided little elaboration, and the limit was overrun quickly. See 1967 REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINCS 
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF TilE UNITED STATES 9 (recommendation for 13 and 15 judges 
respectively for the Ninth and Fifth Circuits). 
383. Set supra text accompanying notes 349-59. 
384. "For the courts of appeals the view is widespread that there comes a point when the 
number of judges is so large that the court cannot function effectively as a collegial body." C. 
WRIGHT, supra note 45, § 3510, at 33. 
385. See Wright, supra note 74, at 968. 
386. See Burdick, supra note 59, at 808-10; McCree, supra note 43, at 782. 
387. "[TJhere is general recognition today that there is a natural limit on the number of 
federal court of appeals judges and that we are either near, or already have exceeded, that limit " 
Posner, supra note 37, at 762. 
388. ld at 765·67. Set also W. McLAUCHLAN, supra note 360, at 109. 
389. See generally Hill & Baker, supra note 68. 
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B. Specialized Appellate Courts 
The subject of specialized courts is, at once, divisive and rather boring. 
Little remains to be said in a general way. However, one rather provocative 
recent proposal deserves mention. 
Specialized appellate courts have been a part of the federal system for a 
long time and their number has recently increased. Since 1950 the United States 
Court of Military Appeals has had appellate jurisdiction over the military justice 
system.390 The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals has exclusive jurisdic-
tion to review decisions of all the district courts in the energy field.391 In 1981 
Congress established the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
and reassigned the nationwide appellate jurisdiction of the eliminated Court of 
Claims and Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.392 There are not more such 
courts because the creation of specialized courts has been consistently disfa-
vored.393 Further specialized courts have been suggested, often depending on 
the proponent's like or dislike for the subject area, in tax law,394 administrative 
law,395 and criminal law.396 
Court specialization Jlds the promise of deepening expertise, uniformity 
and stability, as judges become experienced and encounter the full dimension 
of their subject matter. Proposals for specialized courts have been rejected for 
several reasons: (1) specialized judges develop too narrow a perspective; (2) a 
stratified bar would develop with specialist attorneys having peculiar relation-
ships with their bench; (3) balkanized procedural rules would develop and sub-
stantive principles would evolve in a sheltered environment; (4) a narrower 
subject matter jurisdiction would open the possibility that special interests would 
have undue influence on the area of the law; and (5) limiting jurisdiction would 
limit prestige and attract less able judges.397 Specialization simply threatens 
390. 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1982). See generallY Willis, The United States Court oj Military Appeals -
"Born Again", 52 IND. L.J. 151 (1976). 
391. 15 U.S.C. § 754(a)(1) (1982). A similar tribunal handled price control cases during World 
War II. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). See generallY Elkins, The Temporary Emergency 
Court oj Appeals: A Study in the Abdication oj Judicial Responsibility, 1978 DUKE L.J. 113. 
392. Act of Apr. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. See generallY Petrowitz, Federal 
Court Reform: The Federal Courts Improvement Act oj 1982 - And Beyond, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 543 
(1983). 
393. E.g., P. CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 167-84; J. HOWARD, supra note 31, at 284-86; 
R. LEFLAR, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF ApPELLATE COURTS 41-42, 70-71 (1976); Higgin-
botham, supra note 36, at 268; Lumbard, supra note 162, at 34-35. 
394. Griswold, supra note 10, at 806-07; Griswold, The Need for a Court oj Tax Appeals, 57 
HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1944). 
395. Bork, supra note 379; Cooper, The Proposed United States Administrative Court (pts. 1 & 2), 
35 MICH. L. REV. 193 (1936), 35 MICH. L. REV. 535 (1937). The District of Columbia Circuit has 
come close to being a de facto specialized court for administrative agency review. See also Posner, supra 
note 37, at 789-90. 
396. Haynsworth, supra note 67, at 604-07. 
397. Overton, A Prescription for the Appellate Caseload Explosion, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 205, 
221-22 (1984). 
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the generalist assumptions of the common law order. 398 
Professor Meador has proposed a compromise which seems to offer the 
benefits of a specialized court while minimizing the disadvantages. 399 His ap-
proach calls for selected assignment of appeals by subject matter to designated 
court divisions. Each court of appeals would be divided into relatively permanent 
administrative divisions. For example, a twenty-member court might consist of 
four divisions each with five judges who would sit in panels of three. Each 
division would be assigned several categories of law. For example, division one 
might be assigned antitrust and securities cases. The divisions must be relatively 
permanent to assure continuity and avoid stagnation. One judge in each division 
might rotate to another division each year. Meador's proposal is an obvious 
effort to compromise between the generalist status quo and the feared specialist 
system. The proposal merits close consideration as a possible structural reform 
by Congress. 4oo It just might work. 401 
C. Circuit Splitting 
The present circuit boundaries are quite arbitrary, the product of historical 
accident. 402 Since the court of appeals system was created in 1891, two splits 
398. One commentator summed-up the worries for specialized courts: 
[A I body of law, secluded from the rest, develops a jargon of its own, thought-patterns 
that are unique, internal policies which it subserves and which are different from and 
sometimes at odds with the policies pursued by the general law. 
One you complete the circle of specialization by having a specialized court as well as 
a specialized Bar, then you have set aside a body of wisdom that is the exclusive possession 
of a very small group of men who take their purposes for granted. Very soon their internal 
language becomes so highly stylized as to be unintelligible to the uninitiated. That in turn 
intensifies the seclusiveness of that branch of the law and that further immunizes it against 
the refreshment of new ideas, mggestions, adjustments and compromises which constitute 
the very tissue of any living s),stem of law. In time, like a primitive priest-craft, content 
with its vested privileges, it ceases to proselytize, to win converts to its cause, to persuade 
laymen of the social values that it defends. Such a development is invariably a cause of 
decadence and decay. 
Rilkind, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger qf a Specialized JudiCIary, 37 A.B.A. J. 425, 
425-26 (1951). 
399. See P. CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 174-84; Meador, supra note 37, at 645-47; Meador, 
supra note 74, at 282-85. See generally Meador, An Appellate Court Dilemma and a Solution Through 
Subject Matter Organization, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 471 (1983). 
400. But if. Meador, supra note 37, at 646 (suggesting either a judicial or a legislative im-
plementation ). 
401. The proposal is modeled after a fully operational West German system. &e Meador, 
Appellate Subject Matter Organization: The German Design From an American Experience, 5 HASTINGS INT'L 
& COMPo L. REV. 27 (1981). Another application might involve assigning diversity appeals to 
standing panels of judges familiar with a particular state's substantive law. Now in the Fifth Circuit 
a Texas law decision may be reviewed by three judges from Louisiana. Even in courts of appeals 
with fewer than three judges from one Slate, the out of state judges assigned in this way would 
develop some expertise during their assignment. 
402. Baker, supra note 7, at i36-39 (chronological table). 
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have occurred: The Eighth Circuit was redefined into the Eighth and Tenth 
Circuits in 1929, and the Fifth Circuit was redefined into the Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuits in 1981.403 For a time circuit splitting, dividing the largest courts of 
appeals into two or three new courts, was a commonly mentioned solution. 404 
The problems of the large court, to which splitting is offered as a solution, are 
chiefly the result of simple-mindedly adding judgeships to meet a rising case-
load.405 At some point, even Congress must realize that the addition of judges 
decreases the overall effectiveness of the judicial system.406 
There is a predictable downside to splitting circuits. The more courts of 
appeals, the higher the likelihood of intercircuit conflicts. Furthermore, splitting 
irreversibly dilutes the "federalizing function of courts of appeals. "407 The fewer 
states the circuit includes, the less national the court becomes. Of course, every-
one agrees that adding judges and dividing courts is a limited strategy.408 Per-
haps the most important argument against splitting existing circuits is that the 
reform does not work. Some large circuits which might need splitting, like the 
District of Columbia, Second, and Ninth Circuits, are practically indivisible. 409 
The division of the former Fifth Circuit did not work any miracle. The new 
Fifth Circuit is back to its pre-division statistical crisis level in terms of filings. 410 
The Ninth Circuit, which escaped the 1981 axe is doing well enough to continue 
to resist division. 4JJ 
Rather than splitting existing circuits, the entire geographical scheme could 
be redrawn.412 Such a strategy has its difficulties. Judge Rubin ~oul~~t.r.ive to~_, ... , 
403. See general{y Baker, supra note 359 (discussion of Congress' division of the fonner Fifth 
Circuit into the new Fifth and Eleventh Circuits); Baker, A Primu on Precedent in thl! Eleventh Circuit, 
34 MERCER L. REV. 1175 (1983) (same); Baker, supra note 7 (same). 
404. See general{y Burdick, supra note 59,. at 810-12 (discussing the policy behind splitting the 
Fifth and Ninth Circuits); McCree, supra note 43, at 784-85 (same). 
405. The problems of adding judges are described above. See supra text accompanying notes 
337-89. 
406. "Congress recognize[s] that a point is reached where the addition of judges decreases the 
effectiveness of the court, complicates the administration of unifonn law, and potentially diminishes 
the quality of justice within a circuit." Heflin, Fifth Circuit Court oj Appeals Reorganization Act oj 1980 
- Overdue Relief JOT' an Overworked Court, 11 CUM. L. REV. 597, 616 (1980-81) (citation omitted). 
407. Wisdom, Requinnfor a Creat Court, 26 Loy. L. REV. 787, 788 (1980) (footnotes omitted). 
Su also Wright, supra note 74, at 974. 
408. "[A]re we to continue the splitting process until it becomes mincing, with a United States 
Court of Appeals for the Houston Metropolitan Area?" Gee, The Imminent Destruction oj the Fifth 
Circuit; Or, How Not to Deal with a Blossoming Docket, 9 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 799, 806 (1978). 
409. Carrington, supra note 24, at 587 (discussing how some circuits are not amenable to 
division); HeUman, Legal Prohlems oj Dividing a State Between Fetferal Judicial Circuits, 122 U. PI.. L. 
REV. 1188 (1974) (same). 
410. Speech by Gilbert Ganucheau, Fifth Circuit AppeUate Advocacy Seminar (Oct. 18, 1984), 
reprinted in 2 FIFTH CIR. REP. 301 (1985). See also supra note 356 (despite division of the Fifth 
Circuit, filings continue to be heavy in the Fifth and Eleventh circuits). 
411. Frank, Split 9th Circuit?, 71 A:B.A. J. 30 (1985). Su also supra rlote 255. 
412. The Hruska Commission targeted the Fifth and the Ninth· Circuits for splitting rather 
than produce the unsettling effects of nationwide reorganization. Baker, supra nore 8, at 698 n.91. 
See supra text accompanying notes 93-100. 
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equalize size and workload by creating approximately twenty circuits.413 Judge 
Wallace would consolidate the courts of appeals and dramatically reduce their 
number. 414 Neither approach directly addresses the real problem. Redrawing 
circuit boundaries, by itself, is not worth the effort. More circuits would increase 
the likelihood of intercircuit conflicts. Fewer circuits would increase the likeli-
hood of intracircuit conflicts. Circuit splitting must therefore be dismissed as 
a red-herring, the result of Congress' linear strategy of adding judges. 
D. Proposed Structural Reforms 
Several structural reforms have been proposed. Some have been on the 
drawing board a long time, while others are more recent. Five proposals are 
of particular interest: (1) reducing original federal jurisdiction; (2) instituting 
alternative dispute resolution; (3) creating a new intermediate court; (4) granting 
the courts of appeals discretionary control of their dockets; and (5) consolidating 
the present intermediate tier into one court. The first two proposals might be 
grouped together as remedies for the entire federal judicial institution, but their 
impact on the middle tier would be great. The last three proposals directly 
relate to the courts of appeals and their particular crises. 
1. Reducing Original Jurisdiction 
The most far-reaching proposal for dealing with the courts of appeals' dockets 
does not directly concern appellate jurisdiction. A profound reduction in the 
scope of the original jurisdiction in the district courts would have a radical, 
albeit derivative, impact on the error correction and lawmaking functions of 
the courts of appeals. Hence, such proposals are properly considered here. 
More than a decade ago then Second Circuit Chief Judge Friendly penned 
a remarkable book which so far remains this generation's seminal work on 
reducing and rationalizing the jurisdiction of the federal courtS. 415 All his rec-
ommendations cannot be considered in so small a space as this. Chief Judge 
Friendly's themes, however, bear directly on the thesis here and merit repeating. 
Disciples of his philosophy call on Congress to redefine federal court jurisdiction 
so that the courts can better perform their constitutional mandate. 416 This task 
413. Rubin, supra note 291, at 459. 
414. Wallace, supra note 90, at 940-41. 
415. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW (1973) (based on Chief Judge 
Friendly's celebrated Carpentier Lectures at Columbia Law School). See .l!,merally AMERICAN LAw INST., 
supra note 80; supra text accompanying notes 79-84. The subsequent literary reaction was substantial. 
E.g., Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 634 (1974); Moroney, 
Averting the Flood: Henry J. Friendly and the Junsdiction of the Federal Courts - Part I, 27 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 1071 (1976). 
416. Rubin, supra note 47, at 657. See also Edwards, supra note 6, at 922 (advocating that 
federal courts concentrate jurisdiction resources to art. III claims); Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 15 
(same); Hill & Baker, supra note 68, at 81-85; McCree, supra note 43, at 794 (same). The approach 
is related to the earlier discussed proposal for ranking priority appeals. See supra text accompanying 
notes 246-47. 
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is uniquely political.417 Congress must first preserve the constitutional value of 
redress for those claims and claimants which present the raison d'etre for the 
courts of the third article. Second, public policy obliges Congress to ration 
remaining resources for cases that serve important non-constitutional national 
interests. 
Descending to a lower level of abstraction discloses three difficulties with 
these lofty sentiments.4lB First, during the last two "crisis" decades, the number 
of appeals has risen significantly higher than the number of cases fIled in the 
district courtS.419 Only a very large cutback on original jurisdiction will achieve 
significant appellate reductions. Second, consensus is lacking on which areas to 
target for change. The elimination of diversity jurisdiction, an obvious yet con-
troverted solution,420 would relieve approximately one-fourth of the district courts' 
dockets and one-tenth of the courts of appeals' docI.cets. 421 Third, congressional 
momentum is flowing in the opposite direction. Today, access to federal courts 
is easier than ever before.422 Congress has recently encroached on traditional 
state law domains with neither rhyme nor reason.423 A Jurisdictional Review 
and Revision Commission should be created to study the federal judicial system 
and recommend to Congress lasting structual reforms in jurisdiction.424 
2. Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Related to Chief Judge Friendly's reallocation of disputes to the state courts, 
the theme of reallocating disputes out of the court system altogether has garnered 
417. See Edwards, supra note 6, at 922-24. 
418. See Haworth, supra note 10, at 261. 
419. Id. (statistics). 
420. "Caveat /ector! I am a notorious diversity abolitionist." Baker, Federal Jurisdiction, 16 TEX. 
TECH. L. REV. 145, 164 (1985). But see Frank, The Case for Diversiry Jurisdiction, 16 HARV. J. ON 
LECIS. 403 (1979); Marsh, Diversiry Jurisdiction: Scapegoat of Overcrowded Federal Courts, 48 BROOKLYN 
L. REV. 197 (1982). 
421. Diversiry of Citizenship Jurisdiction, 1982: Hearing on H.R. 6691 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 
95-96 (1982) (statistics for year ending June 30, 1980). See also Griswold, supra note 10, at 796 
(provides estimates of relief for federal courts' dockets by eliminating diversity jurisdiction). 
422. See H~worth, supra note 10, at 261. 
423. Justice Rehnquist lists several examples of this phenomenon: The Federal Child Support 
Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-665 (1982); the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667c 
(1982); the Motor Vehicle Infonnation and Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1901-2012 (1982). 
Rehnquist, supra note 6, at 8-9. Instead, Congress inexplicably proposes to preserve diversity ju-
risdiction while seriously limiting civil rights jurisdiction and eliminating general federal question 
jurisdiction. See Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 14; McGowan, Federalism - Old and New - And the 
Federal Courts, 70 GEO. L.J. 1421 (1982). See generally Weinstein, Coordination of State and Federal 
Judicial Systems, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1 (1982) (discussion of encroachment into areas of traditional 
state concern). 
424. In 1980 such a proposal was introduced. S. 3123, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). See 126 
CONC. REC. 25,747-48 (1980) (text of bill and remarks of Sen. Thunnond). See generally Burger, 
Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 A.B.A. J. 442, 446 (1983) (discussion of needed 
congressional study of jurisdictional refonn for federal courts); Hill & Baker, supra note 68, at 85-
87 (same). 
HeinOnline -- 37 U. Fla. L. Rev.  286 1985
286 UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LA W REVIEW [Vol. XXXVII 
much recent attention. The idea is to provide out-of-court resolution of otherwise 
federal controversies by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and settlements. m 
The impact here would also be felt most directly at the trial level and only 
derivatively at the middle tier. Because at present these methods are not widely 
used, they hold a potential for caseload relief that some find attractive. Judge 
Edwards, a recent convert, suggests that if the caseload and coping mechanisms 
threaten the federal appellate ideal, then an emphasis on alternative dispute 
resolution would preserve substantive rights and enhance the quality of judicial 
determinations. 426 
Alternative dispute resolution methods are rarely used on the federal level 
for three reasons. First, a widespread perception considers a judicial determi-
nation superior to any alternative. 427 Second, the bar has been slow to embrace 
these alternatives although market forces seem to be moving attorneys and 
clients away from a litigious mindset as litigation becomes more costly in terms 
of expenses and delays.428 Third, any such change would require the active 
commitment of the federal government because of its active role in the appellate 
process. 429 
Whatever the intensity of the first two factors, the third factor appears to 
be in a state of flux. Recent congressional proposals go far toward recognizing 
that "[a]ccess to an appropriate forum does not always require a public hearing 
before a life-tenured judge operating under formal rules of evidence and pro-
cedure.' '430 There is a profound need for standards for making the decision 
about allocating disputes, however.431 Certainly, the most important issues of 
constitutional rights belong before an article III judge. On the secondary policy 
level, however, such considerations as probability of error, the need for finality, 
the cost/benefit ratio, public demand, and user satisfaction all affect the political 
allocation. 412 
425. See generally Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts, in POUND CONFERENCE, 
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 150 (A. Levin & R. Wheeler eds. 1979) (discussion of 
alternative out-of-court dispute resolution mechanisms); A. LIND & J. SHEPARD, EVALUATION OF 
COURT·ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1981); Harter, Negotiating Reg-
ulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. (1982); Nejelski & Zeldin, Court-Annexed Arbitration in the 
Federal Courts: 17ze Philadelphia Story, +2 MD. L. REV. 787 (1983); Rosenberg, Devising Procedures that 
Are Civil to Promote Justice that Is Civilized, 69 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1971). 
426. Edwards, supra note 6, at 929. 
427. Id. at 927. 
428. Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 19. See also supra text accompanying notes 290-95. 
429. Wald, supra note 29, at 774. The United States is a party in more than one-third of the 
civil cases on the district courts' dockets. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 22, at 113 
(4th ed. 1983). 
430. Bell, CriSIS in the Courts: Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 3, 7 (1978). See also Note, 
Realigning the Federal Court Caseload, 12 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1001, 1009-12 (1979). Cf FED. R. CIV. 
P. 16(c)(7) (1983) (subjects to be discussed at pretrial conference include "the use of extrajudicial pro-
cedures to resolve the dispute"). 
431. See generally Sarat, supra note 51. 
432. !d. at 307-08. 
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Alternative dispute resolution holds the promise for a long-term reduction 
in demand for federal judicial resources. It may also allow for improved proc-
essing of some routine, fact-specific grievances presently before federal courtS.433 
If implemented, these proposals could have a significant effect on the structure 
of our federal courts system. 
3. A New Intermediate Court 
Creating a new intermediate court is not a new idea.434 Rather than discuss 
the multitude of proposals to expand the vertical structure of the federal courts 
by creating a national court of appeals between the present courts of appeals 
and the Supreme Court, this section will focus on Chief Justice Burger's recent 
proposal. m His proposal may be traced back to the Freund Commission and 
Hruska Commission plans. However, it contains important refinements436 that 
give it an excellent chance of passage. The Chief Justice first endorsed the 
specific recommendation in February 1983.437 For the first time since such pro-
posals have been considered, subcommittees in both the House and Senate 
favorably reported bills based on the plan out to their full judiciary commit-
tees.438 Presently, the Chief Justice's plan calls for creation of a temporary and 
experimental panel-the Intercircuit Panel-composed of court of appeals judges 
selected by the Supreme Court.439 One judge would be selected from each of 
the courts of appeals, creating a panel of nine with four alternates.440 Cases 
would continue to move from the courts of appeals to the Supreme Court, but 
the Supreme Court would have discretion to refer cases to the Intercircuit Panel 
for final national resolution of conflicts and decision of significant federal ques-
tions subject to subsequent Supreme Court review.441 
Understandably, most of the debate has centered on whether this proposal 
would meaningfully relieve the Supreme Court.442 However, those arguments 
433. Edwards, supra note 6, at 936. 
434. "In connection with currently discussed plans for reform of the Federal judiciary, con-
sideration might well be given to the proposal to create a National Court of Appeals, intermediate 
between the Supreme Court of the United States and the several circuit courts of appeals." Dum-
bauld, A NatioTUJI Court of Appeals, 29 GEO. L.J. 461 (1941) (citation omitted). 
435. A separate category of proposals would create a new national court to review state court 
decisions, both civil and criminal. Cameron, Federal Review, FiTUJlity of Stale Court Decisions, and a 
Proposalfor a NatioTUJi Court of Apptals - A Stalejudge's Solution to a Continuing Prohkm, 1981 B.Y.U. 
L. REV. 545, 555-60. 
436. See generally Note, supra note 6, at 1310-17. 
437. Burger, supra note 436, at 443-44. 
438. Hellman, Tk Proposed Intercircuit TrihuTUJ[; Do We Need It? Will It Work?, 11 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q, 375, 377-78 (1984); Chief justice Renews Proposal for a NatioTUJI Intercircuit Panel, THIRD 
BRANCH, Mar. 1985, at 9. 
439. Burger, Tk Time Is Now for 1M Intercircuit Panel, 71 A.B.A. J. 86, 88 (1985). See also S. 
704, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 1985). 
440. The alternates would sit for two two-week sessions each year. Burger, supra note 439, at 
88. 
441. !d. 
442. E.g., Alsup & Salisbury, A Comment on Chief justice Burger's Proposal for a Temporary Panel 
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will not be rehearsed here. Considering the Chief Justice's proposal from the 
viewpoint of the courts of appeals, the experiment risks little and affords great 
promise. Additional appellate capacity could be used to reduce conflicts and 
achieve more national uniformity more quickly. In performing the lawmaking 
function, the Intercircuit Panel would represent a return to the original judicial 
plan, in which the courts of appeals perform the error correction function. The 
strongest argument for Chief Justice Burger's plan is his own candid admission 
that he does not know whether it will work. He has proposed a five-year 
"sunset" provision. If the Intercircuit Panel withstands an actual test, it can 
be renewed. If it proves a failure the plan can be abandoned; even before the 
five-year period has elapsed, the Supreme Court could stop referring cases. The 
Chief Justice's plan should be viewed as a temporary measure. Ultimately a 
basic restructuring of the intermediate tier is needed, but such a restructuring 
does not appear to be immediately forthcoming.44J 
4. Discretionary Courts of Appeals 
In a recent speech criticizing the cost and delay in our federal courts, Justice 
Rehnquist proposed that the basic assumption of the appeal as of right be 
reconsidered. H4 His solution would allow review only when granted in the dis-
cretion of a panel of the court of appeals. 445 Of course, such a proposal assumes 
the right to an appeal is not a matter of due process. 446 Some analogies may 
be seen in present practice, beyond such appellate doctrines as plain error and 
sufficiency of evidence review. Leave to appeal is a feature of the current federal 
procedures for interlocutory appealsH7 and prisoner petitions. 448 Rehearings and 
rehearings en banc are committed to the petitioned court's discretion. 449 
The basic problem with discretion being the rule is the effect such a struc-
tural reform would have on the federal appellate ideal. The original design, in 
to Resolve Intercircuit Conflicts, II HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 359 (1984). While the Chief Justice would 
have the Supreme Court go back to the good old days of hearing 100 cases instead of the present 
150, Justice Rehnquist does not agree. See Rehnquist, supra note 6, at 6. 
443. See generally Thompson, Increasing Uniformity and Capacity in the Ftderal Appel/au Syslmz, II 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457, 487-5M (1984). See also infra text accompanying notes 458·81. 
444. N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1934, at 27, col. I (quoted in Martineau, supra note 45, at 846 
n.5). 
445. !d. This again is not a new idea. In 1941 Roscoe Pound suggested that trial judges be 
arranged in divisions for review of single-judge decisions with appeals being at the discretion of 
the court of appeals. R. POUND, ApPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 390 (1941) (quoted in 
Newbern & Wilson, Rule 21: UnpTtcedent and the Disappean'ng Court, 32 ARK. L. REV. 37, 56-57 
(1978)). See also Haworth, supra note 10, at 321-26 (proposal to create a new appellate division 
between district court and court of appeals with discretionary review in the latter). 
446. Rubin, supra note 291, at 460 n.43. If venerable Supreme Court dicta is accurate, no 
federal constitutional right to appeal exists even in criminal cases. E.g., Jones v. Barnes, 436 U.S. 
745, 749 (1983); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 688 (1894). See generally Carrington, supra 
note 24, at 574-79. 
447. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (196+) (discretion to issue certificate and to hear appeal). 
448. 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1982) (certificate of probable cause requirement). 
449. FED. R. App. P. 35. 
HeinOnline -- 37 U. Fla. L. Rev.  289 1985
1985) PROPOSALS TO REFORM UNITED STA TES COURT OF APPEALS 289 
which courts of appeals perform the correction function, has already been con-
fused by assignment of substantial lawmaking function. Justice Rehnquist's pro-
posal would further diminish the correction function without necessarily improving 
the lawmaking function. It would create two levels of discretionary review -
one too many. Comparison with the Supreme Court and its pure lawmaking 
function is inappropriate.45o A compromise position would apply discretionary 
review only in selected areas like diversity cases and administrative appeals of 
expert fact finding. 451 Creating these two tracks would formally recognize what 
some commentators believe now occurs informally, as less favored categories 
receive less judicial attention in the appellate screening process already in place. 452 
Proponents of discretionary review in the courts of appeals, such as Chief 
Judge Lay of the Eighth Circuit, promise profound benefits.453 Judicial resources 
spent reviewing petitions for discretionary appeal would approximate the present 
investment in screening cases for the nonargument calendar. Obviating the full 
review of briefs and record, oral argument, and opinion drafting in rejected 
appeals would save significant resources over the volume of appeals. Average 
delay between notice of appeal and opinion in decided cases would improve. 
The threshold determination would help remedy a perceived inequity between 
appeals by indigents and paying appellants. Most importandy, all appeals de-
serving of plenary review would receive the full appellate function in a tradi-
tional deliberative process significandy improved by a reduced calendar. 454 
The proposed system of discretionary review power does not diverge greatly 
from the intermediate court's functions of error correction and lawmaking, as 
those functions are performed today. Both systems have a gatekeeping feature, 
whether it is called screening or petitions for review.455 Issues of judicial re-
sponsibility and staff utilization are common to both systems. 456 Whatever the 
ideal solution, the real-world choice is between one appeal as of right,. along 
with a complex four-level judiciary, or "a system of institutionalized case proc-
essing.' '457 
5. Consolidation of the Intermediate Tier 
The direct cause of conflicts among the courts of appeals is not the Supreme 
Court's lack of appellate capacity, b~t rather the individual sovereignty accorded 
the coordinate courts of appeals.458 Two relatively recent innovations, the en 
bane court and the doctrine of the law of the circuit, work together to create 
450. Carrington, supra note 24, at 572. 
451. J. HOWARD, supra note 31, at 287; Lumbard, supra note 162, at 32. 
452. J. HOWARD, supra note 31, at 287-88. 
453. Lay, supra note 52, at 1157. 
454. Proponents argue that a byproduct of this reform would be a decrease in the number 
of second petitions for discretionary review in the Supreme Court. !d. at 1158 n.16. 
455. J. HOWARD, supra note 31, at 288. 
456. See supra text accompanying notes 212-38. 
457. Rubin, supra note 291, at 460 (citation omitted). 
458. Note, supra note 6, at 1317. 
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a degree of sovereignty akin to the juridical deference afforded state to state, 
or nation to state. 459 As Congress increased the number of appellate judges, 
more multiples of three-judge panels threatened two institutional values: uni-
formity among panel decisions, and control of the law of the court of appeals 
by a majority of its judges. The en banc court comprised of all active judges 
developed to preserve these two values. 460 En banc review involves substantial 
delay and expends precious judicial resources. Therefore, the rule of interpanel 
accord developed to minimize en banc rehearings. This principle obliges a panel 
to respect earlier decisions of any panel as binding precedent in the absence 
of an intervening en banc or Supreme Court decision. 461 Together, these prin-
ciples support a balkanized system of precedent; each court of appeals has 
become something of a regional supreme court. 462 Forum shopping, one con-
sequence of this system, reduces effectiveness of legal planning and makes pos-
sible the odious recent practice of the "race to the courthouse" in administrative 
appeals. 463 
From time to time, a structural proposal has been put forward which would 
eliminate altogether the geographical boundaries between courts of appeals. The 
unitary court of appeals might maintain regional offices and courthouses, but 
would maintain a single calendar and one body of precedent binding its three-
judge panels with some provision for a representational selection of en banc 
court. 464 Administrative difficulties, however, might prove insurmountable. A 
single United States Court of Appeals with nationwide jurisdiction would be 
more preferable. 465 However, such a preference does not overcome the concern 
for settled expectations and implementation difficulties. Unifying the courts of 
appeals would create a profound disturbance of stare decisis!66 More impor-
tantly, a unitary court of appeals simply is not politically possible. 467 
Merely redrawing court boundaries would have the same effect on the pres-
ent federal appellate crisis that a weatherman's map marks have on the weather.-
Compromises are possible, however, which would combine boundary realign-
ment with meaningful structural change. The current hegemony could be par-
459. /d. at 317-18. Elsewhere, the author has traced the evolution of these two innovations. 
See generally Baker, supra note 7, at 720-24. Recently, a disquieting problem has appeared which 
independently challenges the majority rule principle. As a result of strict compliance with recusal 
requirements, a minority of judges on a court of appeals may control the rehearing procedure. Stt 
Harper, The Breakdown in Federal Appeals, 70 A.B.A. J. 56 (1984). 
460. Baker, supra note 7, at 723. 
461. /d. Ste also Carrington, supra note 24, at 580. 
462. For a review of the negative consequences of this system, see Carrington, supra note 24, 
at 596-604. 
463. /d. at 598-600. Frequently, the controlling question becomes which party appealed in 
which court of appeals first to attach jurisdiction. See id. at 600. 
464. Burdick, supra note 59, at 812. 
465. See also P. CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 223. 
466. But cj. Baker, supra note 7, at 709-11 (legislating the rules of precedent). 
467. Such "ideal solutions are not attainable and ... political compromise will be essential to 
any improvement that comes." P. CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 223. 
468. See supra text accompanying notes 402-14. 
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tially undone by creating one permanent national en banc court to replace the 
present thirteen,469 or by authorizing the Supreme Court to refer -cases to existing 
en banc courts on a random or rotating basis470 for final national decision. 
Professor Rosenberg proposes that Congress consolidate existing courts of ap-
pe~s into a unified administrative and jurisdictional system.471 Once consoli-
dated, the federal appellate institution would be arranged in divisions. The 
jurisdiction of the current Federal Circuit is one division; the jurisdiction of 
the present courts of appeals marks a second division; and a new central division 
would include sections divided by functions such as criminal appeals, designated 
national law specialties and cases on reference from the Supreme Court.472 Pro-
fessor Rosenberg's far-reaching proposal would achieve dramatic flexibility by 
developing a unified court of appeals with many of the features of Professor 
Meador's earlier discussed compromise for specialized units within one national 
court of appealsy3 Although Professor Rosenberg's plan is somewhat utopiap., 
he is correct in that any meaningful reform must cut through the present forms 
and reformulate the structure of the present arrangement of panel and en banc 
courts. 
One last observation must be made about court of appeals sovereignty and 
the hierarchy of the en banc court. The current crisis obliges a reconsideration 
of the en banc mechanism and how it performs. Such evaluation is critical to 
full consideration of structural reform.474 Former Chief Judge Kaufman of the 
Second Circuit recently delivered a scathing indictment of the en banc pro-
ceeding.475 He concluded that in his experience the disadvantages of the en 
banc mechanism clearly outweigh the advantages.476 Inefficient and wasteful uses 
469. Wallace, supra note 90, at 936-40. 
470. Id. at 935-36. 
471. Rosenberg, Planned Flexibiliry to Meet Changing Needs of the Federal Appellate System, 59 CORNELL 
L. REV. 576, 591-95 (1974). 
472. See Carrington, supra note 24, at 587-96. 
473. See supra text accompanying notes 399-401. 
474. Chief Judge Feinberg, of the Second Circuit, has offered an agenda: 
A careful study of the disposition of requests for en banc hearings in the last decade in 
particular circuits might shed light on the following: (a) To what extent do the circuits 
differ in their receptivity to convening an en banc court? (b) What should be the criteria? 
Are these criteria actually used? (c) Do en banes accomplish anything in settling doctrine? 
It was common knowledge on the Second Circuit that Learned Hand thought they were 
a waste of time. Do subsequent panels bow to the new doctrine or tend to find ways to 
avoid it in instances where the panel majority disagrees with the conclusions of the en 
banc court? (d) How often are en banc decisions relegated to relatively inconsequential 
status by prompt Supreme Court intervention? (e) Does the growing size of circuit courts 
make the en bane procedure unworkable without substantial change? A detailed analysis 
of what has occurred in the [large courts of appeals] ... might be helpful. 
Feinberg, Forward: Judicial Administration: Stepchild of the Law, 52 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 187, 190-91 
(1978) (footnotes omitted). 
475. Remarks by Irving R. Kaufman, The En Banc Proceeding, Second Circuit Judicial Con-
ference (Sept. 14, 1984), revised and reprinted as, Do the Costs of the En Bane Proceeding Outweigh Its 
Advantages?, 69 JUDICATURE 7 (1985). 
476. Id. at 7. 
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of judicial resources include the necessity of: (1) considering motions for re-
hearing; (~) conferencing; (3) opinion drafting; and (4) arduous consensus build-
ing. These tasks are accomplished five times slower than a panel deposition. 477 
The typical result is a majority opinion characterized by careful ambiguity or 
a litany of divergent opinions each with one or two subscribers - all in the 
name of uniformity.478 
Perhaps rehearings en ba.nc should be discarded, rather than merely dis-
approved. 479 If one "law of the circuit" is to prevail, however, some device 
must be available to reconcile conflicting panel decisions. Panel rehearing might 
provide a sufficient intermediate court second look, as might substitution of 
some of the earlier discussed proposals. 480 In the meantime, more specific and en-
forceable guidelines for the proceeding must be developed. 481 
E. A Postscript 
Because the courts of appeals are but an intermediate level of the federal 
judicial system, any lasting reform must implicate the system's structure. Adding 
judges, the traditional congressional solution, seriously weakens existing struc-
ture and function. Techniques for adding capacity to the existing structure seems 
to have been exhausted, as existing courts struggle to cope with large contingents 
of judges. In addition, experience demonstrates the futility of splitting courts 
of appeals. The prospect of specialized courts, without more, holds out little 
hope for sustained progress toward the appellate ideal. Proposals hold more 
promise than past experience. Reducing demand by narrowing the federal court-
house door or by steering disputants through other doors might provide long-
term relief, if jurisdiction reduction and alternative dispute resolution prove 
possible. More direct and radical changes are warranted. Adding vertically to 
the appellate capacity is an attractive short-term solution and should be pursued 
cautiously. Establishing discretionary jurisdiction and challenging conventions of 
en banc sovereignty should also be considered. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
When the courts of appeals were created, the federal judicial system was a 
specialized court system primarily concerned with limited areas of federal con-
cern:82 As the intermediate level's centennial approaches, pressure for change 
477. /d. at 7·8. 
478. /d. at 8. 
479. Cf FED. R. App. P. 35(a) ("Rehearings en bane are not favored and ordinarily WIll not 
be granted .... "). 
480. Some proposals would preserve the en bane device to prevent intereireuit conflict by 
requiring an appeal to be heard en bane when there is an existing intercircuit conflict or when 
the panel is disinclined to follow an earlier holding of a sister court of appeals. Set Handler, What 
to Do with the Supreme Court's Burgeomng Calendars?, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 249, 273 (1984). 
481. Wald, supra note 29, at 7B4. 
482. Clark, supra note 212, at 148. 
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is building. The country's population has increased threefold and the nature 
and volume of federal court litigation no more resembles the litigation these 
courts were created to meet than the current federal presence resembles that 
at the turn of the century.483 The present structure may no longer be able to 
accommodate this change and continue to meet new demands. 484 The intensity 
of the discussion about the federal appellate system during the last decade has 
increased to the 1891 level; that prior debate precipitated that last major struc-
tural change.485 Some signs indicate that a significant reform will soon break 
loose. 
A widely shared perception of crisis has emerged. In that context, consider 
the foregoing discussion of intramural and extramural reforms, both in place 
and proposed. Significant intramural changes have been wrought by judges and 
court administrators during the last two decades. These changes have sought 
to preserve the appelate ideal from workload threats by adjusting the method 
by which courts of appeals perform their traditional role. These measures have 
already changed the face of appellate procedures for oral argument, briefing, 
opinion preparation, and support staff responsibilities. Little remains to be done 
on this level. Remaining intramural proposals, such as the elimination of friv-
olous appeals, also have serious implications for the appellate ideal. Experiments 
and expedients have kept the courts of appeals afloat. Regression is unlikely. 486 
The attack of an overwhelming docket has been blunted. But this has not been 
accomplished without concomitant threats to the federal appellate function. Ef-
ficiency related procedures have fundamentally changed the courts of appeals.487 
483. Griswold, supra note 10, at 790. 
484. Levin, supra note 60, at 2. 
485. Griswold, supra note 10, at 788. 
486. On a philosophical level, perhaps, judges, administrators. lawyers, legislators, and 
researchers may recognize the virtues of a reform philosophy of experimentation, evaluation, 
modification, and change; but in practice there is substantial disparity between [pragmatic] 
principles and contemporary appellate court reform. 
Currendy, techniques that mayor may not reduce delay often are not regarded as 
experimental mechanisms. Rather they are viewed as "solutions," often monolithic ones, 
which should "work," that is, produce the desired effects (preferably immediately) within 
the context of any appellate system. All too often, contemporary appellate court reform is 
characterized by a process whereby (a) a court selects and implements a technique or a 
group of techniques for reducing delay, without first objectively assessing its needs; (b) 
the techniques are subjectively rather than objectively evaluated; (c) the techniques are 
either viewed as successes and continued as part of standard procedure in the form originally 
adopted or are written off as failures and abandoned; and (d) a second court selects and 
tries a single technique or group of techniques, and the process continued. Three flaws 
in this model of appellate improvement are evident: first, the selection of a technique 
without consideration of whether it will actually address the court's problems; second, the 
lack of objective analysis and documentation in determining the success or failure of any 
particular technique; and third, the failure of courts to exchange information about their 
experiences. Thus, under this model, analysis and interchange, fundamental components 
of serious appellate court reform, are undoubtedly all too often disregarded entirely. 
J. MARTIN & E. PRESCOTT, supra note 12, at 77-78. 
487. See Edwards, supra note 6, at 894. 
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To preserve and further what remams of the appellate ideal, Congress must 
consider extramural reformYs Congress, however, has been slow to respond. 
Several impediments to congressional court reform must be overcome, including 
an agenda full of other national issues, a lack of an influential political con-
stituency, special interest opposition, lawyer and bar negativism, and a lack of 
continuity of program and effort. 489 Although they are held dear by the profes-
sion, these courts are the ones "nobody knows. "490 
Ultimately, reform - real structural reform - must come from Congress. 
However, Congress must first contemplate the effect of the courts' efforts to 
help themselves and then choose with care among its many options and com-
binations. Although demands on the courts appear radical and acute, the struc-
tural reforms cannot be. 491 Congress must be above "easy tinkering.,,·m Study 
is the key to overcoming imperfect knowledge of the problems, their solutions 
and their effects. 493 A long-range perspective is desperately needed. The struc-
tural plan must be flexible to meet the changed needs of today and the an-
ticipated needs of a long tomorrow. 494 
Congress should not proceed unguided.495 A blue ribbon commission should 
study the problems of the federal judicial institution and particularly the prob-
lems of the courts of appeals. 196 Structural reform best proceeds from such study 
and dialogue. 497 The study should draw on the formidable resources of the 
Administrative Office for the Federal Courts, the American Bar Association, 
the American Law Institute, the Department of Justice, the Federal Judicial 
Center, the Judicial Conference of the United States, and the Judiciary Com-
488. This assumes that appeals merit preservation. But see Wilner, Civil Appeals: Are They Useful 
In the Administration of Justice?, 56 CEO. L.J. 417 (1968); supra text accompanying notes 444·48 
(abolish). 
489. Meador, supra note 37, at 637-41. 
490. J. HOWARD, supra note 31, at xvii (quoting S. WASBY, EXTRA JUDGES IN "THE COURT 
NOBODY KNOWS"; SOME ASPEGTS OF· DECISION MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF ApPEALS 
1 (1975». 
491. This is important. "The changes in the demands on the courts will be radical. The 
response of the procedural reformers is not likely to be. For this reason alone, procedural reform 
is not going to be the answer to all future needs." Wright, Procedural Reform: lis Limitations and lis 
Future, 1 CA. L. REV. 563, 575 (1967). 
492. Levin, supra note 60, at 2. 
493. Wright, supra note 491, at 578. 
494. After all, the process seems cyclical at centuries. See Burdick, supra note 59, at 815. 
495. Hill & Baker, supra note 68, at 85. 
496. Burger, supra note 424, at 447; Rehnquist, supra note 6, at 6-7. See generally Hill & Baker, 
supra note 68, at 85-87. See also S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1982 US. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 11, 13. "No single change in the organization, procedure, or jurisdiction 
of the Courts of Appeals could substantially reduce congestion of their dockets unless the change 
were so dramatic that it would also effect major change in their function in the federal system." 
ABA REPORT ON ACCOMMODATING THE WORKLOAD OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF ApPEALS 1 
(1968). 
497. Note, supra note 6, at 1324. See generally Cannon & Cikins, Inlerbranch Cooperation in Improving 
the Administration of Justice: A Major Innovation, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (1981). 
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mittees of both Houses of Congress.498 Above all, the study must not lose sight 
of the purpose of our federal judicial institution. Chief Justice Burger said it 
best: "We must constantly keep in mind that the duty of lawyers and the 
function of judges is to deliver the best quality of justice at the least cost in 
the shortest time. "499 
498. Hill & Baker, supra note 68, at 85-86. 
499. Speech by Chief Justice Burger, ABA Annual Meeting (Aug. 14, 1972), quoted in 63 
F.R.D. 465 (1974). 
